Political economy of financial regulation

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Material type: Text

TextSeries: Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ; working paper no. 12851.Publication details: Cambridge, United Kingdom Cambridge University Press 2019Description: xiv, 515pISBN:

9781108470360

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685.15 PO-

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Abstract: "We investigate the causes and consequences of financial regulation by studying the political economy of U.S. state usury laws in the 19th century. We find evidence that usury laws were binding and enforced and that lending activity was affected by rate ceilings. Exploiting the heterogeneity across states and time in regulation, enforcement, and market conditions, we find that regulation tightens when it is less costly and when it coexists with other economic and political restrictions that exclude certain groups. Furthermore, the same determinants of financial regulation that favor one group (and restrict others) are associated with higher (lower) future economic growth rates. The evidence suggests regulation is the outcome of private interests using the coercive power of the state to extract rents from other groups, highlighting the endogeneity of financial development and growth"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

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Item type	Home library	Collection	Shelving location	Call number	Materials specified	Status	Date due	Barcode
Print	OPJGU Sonepat- Campus	General Books	Main Library	685.15 PO- (Browse shelf(Opens below))		Available		141142

Title from PDF file as viewed on 3/23/2007.

Includes bibliographical references.

"We investigate the causes and consequences of financial regulation by studying the political economy of U.S. state usury laws in the 19th century. We find evidence that usury laws were binding and enforced and that lending activity was affected by rate ceilings. Exploiting the heterogeneity across states and time in regulation, enforcement, and market conditions, we find that regulation tightens when it is less costly and when it coexists with other economic and political restrictions that exclude certain groups. Furthermore, the same determinants of financial regulation that favor one group (and restrict others) are associated with higher (lower) future economic growth rates. The evidence suggests regulation is the outcome of private interests using the coercive power of the state to extract rents from other groups, highlighting the endogeneity of financial development and growth"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.