Political economy of financial regulation
Political economy of financial regulation
- Cambridge, United Kingdom Cambridge University Press 2019
- xiv, 515p.
- Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ; working paper no. 12851. .
Title from PDF file as viewed on 3/23/2007.
Includes bibliographical references.
"We investigate the causes and consequences of financial regulation by studying the political economy of U.S. state usury laws in the 19th century. We find evidence that usury laws were binding and enforced and that lending activity was affected by rate ceilings. Exploiting the heterogeneity across states and time in regulation, enforcement, and market conditions, we find that regulation tightens when it is less costly and when it coexists with other economic and political restrictions that exclude certain groups. Furthermore, the same determinants of financial regulation that favor one group (and restrict others) are associated with higher (lower) future economic growth rates. The evidence suggests regulation is the outcome of private interests using the coercive power of the state to extract rents from other groups, highlighting the endogeneity of financial development and growth"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
9781108470360
2007615087
Financial institutions -- Management.
Financial institutions -- Law and legislation.
Financial institutions -- Government policy.
HB1
685.15 / PO-
Title from PDF file as viewed on 3/23/2007.
Includes bibliographical references.
"We investigate the causes and consequences of financial regulation by studying the political economy of U.S. state usury laws in the 19th century. We find evidence that usury laws were binding and enforced and that lending activity was affected by rate ceilings. Exploiting the heterogeneity across states and time in regulation, enforcement, and market conditions, we find that regulation tightens when it is less costly and when it coexists with other economic and political restrictions that exclude certain groups. Furthermore, the same determinants of financial regulation that favor one group (and restrict others) are associated with higher (lower) future economic growth rates. The evidence suggests regulation is the outcome of private interests using the coercive power of the state to extract rents from other groups, highlighting the endogeneity of financial development and growth"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
9781108470360
2007615087
Financial institutions -- Management.
Financial institutions -- Law and legislation.
Financial institutions -- Government policy.
HB1
685.15 / PO-