MARC details
000 -LEADER |
fixed length control field |
02310cam a22003857a 4500 |
001 - CONTROL NUMBER |
control field |
14781004 |
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER |
control field |
JGU |
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION |
control field |
20190729225102.0 |
007 - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION FIXED FIELD--GENERAL INFORMATION |
fixed length control field |
Hardbound |
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
fixed length control field |
070323s2007 mau sb 000 0 eng |
010 ## - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CONTROL NUMBER |
LC control number |
2007615087 |
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER |
International Standard Book Number |
9781108470360 |
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE |
Original cataloging agency |
DLC |
Transcribing agency |
DLC |
050 00 - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER |
Classification number |
HB1 |
082 ## - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER |
Classification number |
685.15 |
Item number |
PO- |
245 14 - TITLE STATEMENT |
Title |
Political economy of financial regulation |
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) |
Place of publication, distribution, etc |
Cambridge, United Kingdom |
Name of publisher, distributor, etc |
Cambridge University Press |
Date of publication, distribution, etc |
2019 |
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
Extent |
xiv, 515p. |
500 ## - GENERAL NOTE |
General note |
Title from PDF file as viewed on 3/23/2007. |
504 ## - BIBLIOGRAPHY, ETC. NOTE |
Bibliography, etc |
Includes bibliographical references. |
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. |
Summary, etc |
"We investigate the causes and consequences of financial regulation by studying the political economy of U.S. state usury laws in the 19th century. We find evidence that usury laws were binding and enforced and that lending activity was affected by rate ceilings. Exploiting the heterogeneity across states and time in regulation, enforcement, and market conditions, we find that regulation tightens when it is less costly and when it coexists with other economic and political restrictions that exclude certain groups. Furthermore, the same determinants of financial regulation that favor one group (and restrict others) are associated with higher (lower) future economic growth rates. The evidence suggests regulation is the outcome of private interests using the coercive power of the state to extract rents from other groups, highlighting the endogeneity of financial development and growth"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site. |
530 ## - ADDITIONAL PHYSICAL FORM AVAILABLE NOTE |
Additional physical form available note |
Also available in print. |
538 ## - SYSTEM DETAILS NOTE |
System details note |
System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. |
538 ## - SYSTEM DETAILS NOTE |
System details note |
Mode of access: World Wide Web. |
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
Financial institutions -- Management. |
9 (RLIN) |
62717 |
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
Financial institutions -- Law and legislation. |
9 (RLIN) |
62718 |
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
Financial institutions -- Government policy. |
9 (RLIN) |
62719 |
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
Personal name |
Avgouleas, Emilios |
9 (RLIN) |
62720 |
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
Personal name |
Donald, David C. |
9 (RLIN) |
62721 |
830 #0 - SERIES ADDED ENTRY--UNIFORM TITLE |
Uniform title |
Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ; |
Volume number/sequential designation |
working paper no. 12851. |
9 (RLIN) |
62722 |
856 40 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS |
Uniform Resource Identifier |
<a href="http://papers.nber.org/papers/w12851">http://papers.nber.org/papers/w12851</a> |
906 ## - LOCAL DATA ELEMENT F, LDF (RLIN) |
a |
7 |
b |
cbc |
c |
orignew |
d |
4 |
e |
ncip |
f |
20 |
g |
y-gencompf |
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
Source of classification or shelving scheme |
Dewey Decimal Classification |
Koha item type |
Print |