US Supreme Court Opinions and their Audiences / Ryan C. Black, Ryan J. Owens, Justin Wedeking, Patrick C. Wohlfarth.

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 09 Feb 2016).

This book is the first study specifically to investigate the extent to which US Supreme Court justices alter the clarity of their opinions based on expected reactions from their audiences. The authors examine this dynamic by creating a unique measure of opinion clarity and then testing whether the Court writes clearer opinions when it faces ideologically hostile and ideologically scattered lower federal courts; when it decides cases involving poorly performing federal agencies; when it decides cases involving states with less professionalized legislatures and governors; and when it rules against public opinion. The data shows the Court writes clearer opinions in every one of these contexts, and demonstrates that actors are more likely to comply with clearer Court opinions.

Cover; Half-title; Title page; Copyright information; Dedication; Table of contents; Acknowledgement; 1 Introduction; 2 A theory: using opinion clarity to enhance compliance and manage public support; 3 Estimating the clarity of Supreme Court opinions; 4 Supreme Court opinions and federal circuit courts; 5 Supreme Court opinions and federal agency implementors; 6 Supreme Court opinions and the states; 7 Supreme Court opinions and the secondary population; 8 Establishing compliance as a function of clarity; 9 Conclusion; References; Index; 1.1 Audiences and the Supreme Court.

1.2 Overcoming audience-based obstacles using opinionclarity1.3 Why care about strategic opinion writing?; 1.4 Structure of the book; 2.1 Literature on responsive compliance; 2.2 Theorizing how the Court uses opinion clarity to enhance compliance and manage public support; 2.3 Face validity for the theory; 3.1 Previous efforts to measure opinion clarity; 3.2 Our approach: textual readability; 4.1 A theory of opinion clarity and federal circuit courts; 4.2 Lower court audiences and legal motivations; 4.3 Lower court audiences and ideological motivations; 4.4 Data and measures.

4.5 Methods and results4.6 Discussion; 5.1 A theory of opinion clarity and federal agencies; 5.2 The Supreme Court and federal agencies; 5.3 How past performance and agency characteristics influence Supreme Court opinion clarity; 5.4 Data and measures; 5.5 Methods and results; 5.6 Discussion; 6.1 A theory of opinion clarity and states; 6.2 Legislative and gubernatorial professionalism; 6.3 Data and measures; 6.4 Methods and results; 6.5 Discussion; 6.6 Appendix to Chapter 6; 7.1 A theory of opinion clarity and the mass public.

7.2 An individual-level analysis of opinion clarityand public opinion7.3 An aggregate analysis of opinion clarity and publicopinion; 7.4 Discussion; 7.5 Appendix to Chapter 7; 8.1 Modeling lower court compliance as a functionof opinion clarity; 8.2 A study of non-elite compliance as a functionof opinion clarity; 8.3 Discussion; 2.1.1 Responsive compliance as a function of ideological congruence with the Supreme Court; 2.1.2 Responsive compliance as a function of opinion coalitions and case characteristics; 2.1.3 Responsive compliance as a function of audience resources.

2.1.4 Responsive compliance as a function of opinion clarity2.2.1 Using clarity to enhance compliance; 2.2.2 Using clarity to manage public support; 3.2.1 Validating our readability measure; 4.2.1 Ensuring legal uniformity through agenda-setting; 4.2.2 Ensuring legal uniformity by writing clear opinions; 4.3.1 Ensuring policy compliance through agenda-setting; 4.3.2 Ensuring policy compliance through opinion clarity; 6.2.1 Professionalism, legislator quality, and informational deficiencies; 6.2.2 Professionalism and obstructionist legislation; 6.2.3 Professionalism and whistle-blowers.

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