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035 _a(OCoLC)990544142
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082 0 4 _a355.00947
088 _aRR-1498-A
049 _aMAIN
100 1 _aKofman, Michael.
_91163477
245 1 0 _aLessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.
260 _aSanta Monica :
_bRAND Corporation,
_c2017.
300 _a1 online resource (128 pages)
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
490 1 _a[Research report] ;
_vRR-1498-A
588 0 _aPrint version record.
505 0 _aCover ; Title Page; Copyright; Preface; Contents; Figures and Table; Summary; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; CHAPTER ONE: Introduction; CHAPTER TWO: The Annexation of Crimea; How Russia Annexed Crimea; The Balance of Forces; A Chronology of Events; Russia's Information Campaign; Characteristics of the Crimean Operation; Russian-Crimean History; Cultural Proximity Between Russia and Crimea; Geography; Russia's Force Posture and Transit Arrangements with Ukraine; Target of Opportunity; Ukrainian Actions Contributing to Russian Success; Factors Enabling Russia's Operational Successes.
505 8 _aForce CompositionMobility; Use of Deception at the Tactical and Strategic Levels; Use of Conventional Exercises as Cover; Privileging Speed, Agility, and Communications over Firepower; Preparing for Counterattack; Factors Contributing to Russia's Operational Shortcomings; Turning Local Forces; Psychological Operations; Planning for Nonviolent Resistance; Political Management of Local Elites; Information Operations; Conclusion: Implications and Effects; CHAPTER THREE: Separatism and Aggression in Eastern Ukraine (March-May 2014); How Russia Destabilized Eastern Ukraine; Chronology of Events.
505 8 _aCharacteristics of the Eastern Ukraine OperationThe Ukrainian Context; The Information Campaign; The "Separatists"; The Powerful Nonstate Actors Behind Each Camp; Russia's Possible Lessons Learned; Small Investments Yield Small Benefits; Political Warfare Requires Knowing Your Target; Irregular Forces Are Difficult to Control; Nonstate Actors Matter; Former Soviet Republics Have an Ample Pool of Available Fighters; Conventional Forces Are Only a Temporary Deterrent; Political Timing Is Important; Russia's Operational Shortcomings; Russia Struggled to Control Political Warfare.
505 8 _aRussia Was Ineffective at Inspiring SeparatismPoor Assumptions Guided Moscow's Strategy; Hybrid War Was a Brief Adaptation in This Conflict; Conclusion: Implications and Effects; CHAPTER FOUR: Conclusion; APPENDIXES; A. Information Campaign; B. Timeline (February 18-May 31, 2014); References.
504 _aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 95-109).
520 _aThis report assesses the annexation of Crimea by Russia (February-March 2014) and the early phases of political mobilization and combat operations in Eastern Ukraine (late February-late May 2014). It examines Russia's approach, draws inferences from Moscow's intentions, and evaluates the likelihood of such methods being used again elsewhere. These two distinct campaigns overlap somewhat but offer different lessons for participants and observers. The report finds that Russia's operation to annex Crimea represented a decisive and competent use of military force in pursuit of political ends. Russia's operations in Crimea benefited from highly favorable circumstances--political, historical, geographical, and military--that limit their generalizability. Analysis of the operation underscores that there are many remaining unknowns about Russia's military capabilities, especially in the aftermath of its military reforms and modernization program. The report also finds that the campaign in Eastern Ukraine was an ineffectually implemented--and perhaps ill-conceived--effort to achieve political fragmentation of Ukraine via federalization and retain Russian influence. Russia achieved its primary objectives but at a much higher cost than desired and through a fitful cycle of adaptation. This study thus questions the desirability for Moscow to replicate a course of events similar to the campaign in Eastern Ukraine. Conversely, the operation to annex Crimea was a highly successful employment of select elements within Russia's armed forces, making it an attractive use of military power, but the structural and operation factors contributing to its success raise doubts whether it can be repeated elsewhere.
590 _aeBooks on EBSCOhost
_bEBSCO eBook Subscription Academic Collection - Worldwide
650 0 _aUkraine Conflict, 2014-
_9808372
651 0 _aCrimea (Ukraine)
_xHistory, Military
_y21st century.
_91163478
651 0 _aRussia (Federation)
_xRelations
_zUkraine.
_91163479
651 0 _aRussia (Federation)
_xHistory, Military
_y21st century.
_91163480
651 0 _aUkraine
_xRelations
_zRussia (Federation)
_91163481
650 0 _aFrozen conflicts.
_91163482
650 0 _aGrey areas.
_91163483
650 0 _aTerritorial disputes.
_91163484
650 6 _aConflit ukrainien, 2014-
_91033352
650 7 _aHISTORY
_zEurope
_xEastern.
_2bisacsh
_9867999
650 7 _aHISTORY
_zEurope
_xFormer Soviet Republics.
_2bisacsh
650 7 _aHISTORY
_zEurope
_xRussia & the Former Soviet Union.
_2bisacsh
_9868001
650 7 _aInternational relations.
_2fast
_0(OCoLC)fst00977053
651 7 _aRussia.
_2fast
_0(OCoLC)fst01207312
_946150
651 7 _aRussia (Federation)
_2fast
_0(OCoLC)fst01262050
_933559
651 7 _aUkraine.
_2fast
_0(OCoLC)fst01211738
_9853368
651 7 _aUkraine
_zCrimea.
_2fast
_0(OCoLC)fst01265017
_91031860
650 7 _aRussian Federation.
_2pplt
_9852491
650 7 _aUkraine.
_2pplt
_9543471
650 7 _aCrimea.
_2pplt
_91163485
650 7 _aAnnexation.
_2pplt
_91163486
650 7 _aArmed forces.
_2pplt
_991765
650 7 _aInternational relations.
_2pplt
647 7 _aUkraine Conflict
_d(2014- )
_2fast
_0(OCoLC)fst01921502
648 7 _a2000-2099
_2fast
655 4 _aElectronic books.
655 7 _aMilitary history.
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_0(OCoLC)fst01411630
_9849273
700 1 _aMigacheva, Katya.
_91163487
700 1 _aNichiporuk, Brian,
_d1966-
_91037730
700 1 _aRadin, Andrew.
_9443319
700 1 _aTkacheva, Olesya.
_9361230
700 1 _aOberholtzer, Jenny.
_91163488
776 0 8 _iPrint version:
_aKofman, Michael.
_tLessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.
_dSanta Monica : RAND Corporation, ©2017
_z9780833096067
830 0 _aResearch report (Rand Corporation) ;
_vRR-1498-A.
_9371021
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