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The handbook of market design / edited by Nir Vulkan, Alvin E. Roth and Zvika Neeman.

Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextPublisher: Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2013Description: 1 online resource (xxiv, 681 pages) : illustrationsContent type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9780191668432
  • 0191668435
  • 9780191765957
  • 0191765953
  • 1299939759
  • 9781299939752
Subject(s): Genre/Form: Additional physical formats: Print version:: Handbook of market designDDC classification:
  • 338.501 23
LOC classification:
  • HF5470 .H36 2013eb
Online resources:
Contents:
Cover; Contents; List of Figures; List of Tables; List of Contributors; Introduction; PART I: GENERAL PRINCIPLES; 1. What Have We Learned From Market Design?; 2. Not Up To Standard: Stress Testing Market Designs for Misbehavior; 3. Using and Abusing Auction Theory; PART II: CASES; SECTION II. A: MATCHING MARKETS; 4. Market Design for Kidney Exchange; 5. School Choice; 6. Improving Efficiency in School Choice; 7. Can the Job Market for Economists Be Improved?; 8. Designing Markets for Ideas; 9. Redesigning Microcredit; SECTION II. B: AUCTIONS.
10. The Product-Mix Auction: A New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods11. Optimal Incentives in Core-Selecting Auctions; 12. Auctioning Rough Diamonds: A Competitive Sales Process for BHP Billitoris Ekati Diamonds; SECTION II. C: E-COMMERCE; 13. Ending Rules in Internet Auctions: Design and Behavior; 14. Designing Markets for Mixed Use of Humans and Automated Agents; 15. The Design of Online Advertising Markets; 16. Very-Large-Scale Generalized Combinatorial Multi-Attribute Auctions: Lessons from Conducting 60 Billion of Sourcing.
17. Designing Automated Markets for Communication BandwidthSECTION II. D: LAW DESIGN; 18. A Mechanism Design Approach to Legal Problems; 19. Legislation with Endogenous Preferences; PART III: EXPERIMENTS; 20. Common-Value Auctions with Liquidity Needs: An Experimental Test of a Troubled-Assets Reverse Auction; 21. Information Disclosure in Auctions: An Experiment; 22. Experiments with Buyer-Determined Procurement Auctions; 23. The Inefficiency of Splitting the Bill; PART IV: COMPETING DESIGNS; 24. Competing Mechanisms; 25. Three Case Studies of Competing Designs in Financial Markets; Index; A.
BC; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P; Q; R; S; T; U; W; Y.
Summary: This handbook brings together the latest research on applied market design. It surveys matching markets: environments where there is a need to match large two-sided populations to one another, such as law clerks and judges or patients and kidney donors.
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Electronic-Books Electronic-Books OPJGU Sonepat- Campus E-Books EBSCO Available

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Print version record.

This handbook brings together the latest research on applied market design. It surveys matching markets: environments where there is a need to match large two-sided populations to one another, such as law clerks and judges or patients and kidney donors.

Cover; Contents; List of Figures; List of Tables; List of Contributors; Introduction; PART I: GENERAL PRINCIPLES; 1. What Have We Learned From Market Design?; 2. Not Up To Standard: Stress Testing Market Designs for Misbehavior; 3. Using and Abusing Auction Theory; PART II: CASES; SECTION II. A: MATCHING MARKETS; 4. Market Design for Kidney Exchange; 5. School Choice; 6. Improving Efficiency in School Choice; 7. Can the Job Market for Economists Be Improved?; 8. Designing Markets for Ideas; 9. Redesigning Microcredit; SECTION II. B: AUCTIONS.

10. The Product-Mix Auction: A New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods11. Optimal Incentives in Core-Selecting Auctions; 12. Auctioning Rough Diamonds: A Competitive Sales Process for BHP Billitoris Ekati Diamonds; SECTION II. C: E-COMMERCE; 13. Ending Rules in Internet Auctions: Design and Behavior; 14. Designing Markets for Mixed Use of Humans and Automated Agents; 15. The Design of Online Advertising Markets; 16. Very-Large-Scale Generalized Combinatorial Multi-Attribute Auctions: Lessons from Conducting 60 Billion of Sourcing.

17. Designing Automated Markets for Communication BandwidthSECTION II. D: LAW DESIGN; 18. A Mechanism Design Approach to Legal Problems; 19. Legislation with Endogenous Preferences; PART III: EXPERIMENTS; 20. Common-Value Auctions with Liquidity Needs: An Experimental Test of a Troubled-Assets Reverse Auction; 21. Information Disclosure in Auctions: An Experiment; 22. Experiments with Buyer-Determined Procurement Auctions; 23. The Inefficiency of Splitting the Bill; PART IV: COMPETING DESIGNS; 24. Competing Mechanisms; 25. Three Case Studies of Competing Designs in Financial Markets; Index; A.

BC; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P; Q; R; S; T; U; W; Y.

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