The handbook of market design / edited by Nir Vulkan, Alvin E. Roth and Zvika Neeman.
Material type:![Text](/opac-tmpl/lib/famfamfam/BK.png)
- text
- computer
- online resource
- 9780191668432
- 0191668435
- 9780191765957
- 0191765953
- 1299939759
- 9781299939752
- 338.501 23
- HF5470 .H36 2013eb
Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Materials specified | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
![]() |
OPJGU Sonepat- Campus | E-Books EBSCO | Available |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Print version record.
This handbook brings together the latest research on applied market design. It surveys matching markets: environments where there is a need to match large two-sided populations to one another, such as law clerks and judges or patients and kidney donors.
Cover; Contents; List of Figures; List of Tables; List of Contributors; Introduction; PART I: GENERAL PRINCIPLES; 1. What Have We Learned From Market Design?; 2. Not Up To Standard: Stress Testing Market Designs for Misbehavior; 3. Using and Abusing Auction Theory; PART II: CASES; SECTION II. A: MATCHING MARKETS; 4. Market Design for Kidney Exchange; 5. School Choice; 6. Improving Efficiency in School Choice; 7. Can the Job Market for Economists Be Improved?; 8. Designing Markets for Ideas; 9. Redesigning Microcredit; SECTION II. B: AUCTIONS.
10. The Product-Mix Auction: A New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods11. Optimal Incentives in Core-Selecting Auctions; 12. Auctioning Rough Diamonds: A Competitive Sales Process for BHP Billitoris Ekati Diamonds; SECTION II. C: E-COMMERCE; 13. Ending Rules in Internet Auctions: Design and Behavior; 14. Designing Markets for Mixed Use of Humans and Automated Agents; 15. The Design of Online Advertising Markets; 16. Very-Large-Scale Generalized Combinatorial Multi-Attribute Auctions: Lessons from Conducting 60 Billion of Sourcing.
17. Designing Automated Markets for Communication BandwidthSECTION II. D: LAW DESIGN; 18. A Mechanism Design Approach to Legal Problems; 19. Legislation with Endogenous Preferences; PART III: EXPERIMENTS; 20. Common-Value Auctions with Liquidity Needs: An Experimental Test of a Troubled-Assets Reverse Auction; 21. Information Disclosure in Auctions: An Experiment; 22. Experiments with Buyer-Determined Procurement Auctions; 23. The Inefficiency of Splitting the Bill; PART IV: COMPETING DESIGNS; 24. Competing Mechanisms; 25. Three Case Studies of Competing Designs in Financial Markets; Index; A.
BC; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P; Q; R; S; T; U; W; Y.
eBooks on EBSCOhost EBSCO eBook Subscription Academic Collection - Worldwide
There are no comments on this title.