The normativity of what we care about : a love-based theory of practical reasons / Katrien Schaubroeck.

A love-based reason theory as a new perspective in the debate on practical reasons. Reasons and obligations pervade our lives. The alarm clock gives us a reason to get up in the morning, the expectations of colleagues or clients give us a reason to do our jobs well, the misery in developing countries gives us a reason to donate money, headaches give us a reason to take an aspirin. Looking for unity in variety, philosophers wonder what makes a consideration count as a reason to do something. The nature and source of practical reasons has been debated intensively over the last three decennia in analytic philosophy. This book discusses the three most influential theories in current debates, referred to as the desire-based, the value-based, and the rationality-based theories of practical reasons. The author argues that all three are defective because they overlook the role of what agents care about.

Print version record.

Includes bibliographical references.

Preface; Introduction; Chapter 1; Internalism and externalism: some terminology; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 Falk and Frankena; 1.3 The internalist position modified; 1.4 The externalist position elaborated; 1.5 Judgment internalism/externalism versus existence internalism/externalism; 1.6 Other kinds of internalism and externalism; 1.7 Varieties of existence internalism and externalism ; 1.8 Conclusion; Chapter 2; Bernard Williams on practical reasons; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 The internal reason theory; 2.3 Refining the sub-Humean model; 2.4 Objections to external reasons.

2.4.1 The no-explanatory-force objection2.4.2 The no-motivational-fuel objection; 2.4.3 The obscurity objection; 2.5 The Tess case: an objection to Williams' internal reason theory; 2.6 Conclusion; Chapter 3; Michael Smith on practical reasons; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 The moral problem; 3.3 Cognitivism, internalism and Humean motivation; 3.3.1 The objectivity of moral obligations; 3.3.2 The practicality of moral judgements; 3.3.3 The Humean theory of motivation; 3.4 The conceptual analysis of normative reasons; 3.4.1 Platitudes about normative reasons.

3.4.2 The advice model (as opposed to the example model)3.4.3 The 'if fully rational' condition: Smith versus Williams; 3.4.4 The analysis captures the platitudes; 3.5 Moral rationalism: the solution to the moral problem; 3.6 Smith's analysis of normative reasons evaluated; 3.6.1 The analysis trivializes convergence; 3.6.2 Why do reasons have to be objective?; 3.6.3 The analysis does not guarantee practicality; 3.6.4 The analysis rests on a false platitude; 3.6.5 Normative reasons and what I would desire if I were fully rational.

3.6.6 The advice model is inconsistent with the convergence thesis3.7 Conclusion; Chapter 4; Derek Parfit on practical reasons; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Parfit's externalism; 4.2.1 The obscurity objection rejected; 4.2.2 The no-explanatory-force objection rejected; 4.2.3 The no-motivational-fuel objection rejected; 4.3 Parfit's value-based reason theory; 4.3.1 Internalism and the desire-based reason theory; 4.3.2 Parfit's argument against reductive desire-based reason views; 4.3.3 Parfit's argument against non-reductive desire-based reason views.

4.3.4 Arguments in favour of the value-based reason theory4.4 Parfit's normative non-naturalism; 4.4.1 Korsgaard's criticism of realism; 4.4.2 Korsgaard's constructivism; 4.4.3 Parfit's criticism of constructivism; 4.4.4 The non-naturalist account of normativity evaluated; 4.5 Conclusion; Chapter 5; Harry Frankfurt on practical reasons; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2. Frankfurt's theory of care and love; 5.2.1 The hierarchical model; 5.2.2 Care; 5.2.3 Love; 5.3 The love-based reason theory; 5.4 The love-based reason theory evaluated; 5.4.1 Love and desire: both motivating, both natural.

eBooks on EBSCOhost EBSCO eBook Subscription Academic Collection - Worldwide