Personal identity : complex or simple? / edited by Georg Gasser and Matthias Stefan.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Print version record.

This book addresses whether personal identity is analyzable, with innovative discussion of 'complex' and 'simple' theories.

PERSONAL IDENTITY -- Title -- Illustrations -- Contributors -- Introduction -- THE PROJECT -- THE QUESTION OF PERSONAL IDENTITY -- THE DEBATE ABOUT PERSONAL IDENTITY -- THE BIOLOGICAL APPROACH -- THE PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH -- TWO PROBLEMS FOR COMPLEX APPROACHES -- FOUR-DIMENSIONALISM -- THE SIMPLE VIEW -- CONCLUSION -- PART I. : Framing the question -- 1. Chitchat on personal identity -- 2. In search of the simple view -- SIMPLE AND COMPLEX VIEWS -- PRELIMINARIES -- GROUNDING AND CRITERIA -- ANTI-CRITERIALISM -- ANALYZABILITY -- ADVOCATES OF ANALYTIC CRITERIALISM.

EMPIRICIST THEORIESBRUTENESS -- NOONAN'S PROPOSAL -- SPECIFIC AND UNSPECIFIC -- EXPLANATORY DEMANDS -- 3. Personal identity, indeterminacy and obligation -- PERSONAL IDENTITY AND INDETERMINACY -- INDETERMINACY AND OBLIGATION -- INDETERMINACY AND MORAL DILEMMAS -- OBJECTIONS TO EPISTEMICISM -- INDETERMINACY AND SUBJECTIVISM -- 4. Personal identity and its perplexities -- INTRODUCTION -- THE PROBLEM OF PERSONAL IDENTITY -- THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE SIMPLE AND THE COMPLEX VIEW OF DIACHRONIC PERSONAL IDENTITY -- THE INDEXICALITY OF THE CONCEPT OF A PERSON -- THE COMPLEX VIEW AND INDETERMINACY.

PART II. : Arguments for and against simplicity -- 5. : How to determine which is the true -- THE PROBLEM -- LOGICAL POSSIBILITY -- A POSTERIORI METAPHYSICAL POSSIBILITY -- THE HUMAN SOUL -- 6. Against simplicity -- I -- II -- III -- IV -- V -- 7. The probable simplicity of personal identity -- WHY SHOULD WE SEEK A CRITERION OF PERSONAL IDENTITY -- IDENTITY FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW -- WHAT IS A PERSON -- LOCKE'S CRITERION OF PERSONAL IDENTITY -- THE FATAL CIRCULARITY IN ANY NEO-LOCKEAN CRITERION -- REPLY TO AN OBJECTION -- 8. Reply to E.J. Lowe.

9. The non-descriptive individual nature of conscious beingsINTRODUCTION -- THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS AND METAPHYSICAL BASES OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S EXISTENCE -- NON-DESCRIPTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR AN INDIVIDUAL'S EXISTENCE -- THE INDIVIDUAL NATURE OF A STONE -- PERFECT COUNTERPARTS OF CONSCIOUS INDIVIDUALS -- THE CENTRAL CONCEPTUAL DISANALOGY -- CLARIFICATIONS OF THE CONCEPTUAL DISANALOGY CLAIM -- THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF THE EXISTENCE OF CONSCIOUS INDIVIDUALS -- IMPLICIT CONCEPTS AND PHILOSOPHICAL INSIGHTS -- ACCESS TO THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUS BEINGS ON THE BASIS OF BEING A CONSCIOUS BEING.

PART III. : Reconsidering simplicity -- 10. : Personal identity: a not-so-simple simple view -- WHAT IS A SIMPLE VIEW OF PERSONAL IDENTITY -- A FIRST-PERSONAL APPROACH -- WHY NOT-SO-SIMPLE -- DO PERSONS HAVE PARTS -- WHY THERE ARE NO INFORMATIVE CRITERIA OF PERSONAL IDENTITY -- OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES -- CONCLUSION -- 11. Is "person" a sortal term -- INTRODUCTORY REMARKS -- "PERSON" IS A SORTAL TERM -- THE DON'T CARE VIEW -- "PERSON" IS A SEMANTICALLY UNIQUE TERM -- THE KIND OF PERSONS -- THE INDIVIDUAL FORM OF PERSONS -- THE UNITY-OF-CONSCIOUSNESS ARGUMENT.

12. Materialism, dualism, and "simple" theories of personal identity.

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