Aristotle on desire / Giles Pearson.

"Desire is a central concept in Aristotle's ethical and psychological works, but he does not provide us with a systematic treatment of the notion itself. This book reconstructs the account of desire latent in his various scattered remarks on the subject and analyses its role in his moral psychology. Topics include: the range of states that Aristotle counts as desires (orexeis); objects of desire (orekta) and the relation between desires and envisaging prospects; desire and the good; Aristotle's three species of desire: epithumia (pleasure-based desire), thumos (retaliatory desire) and boulêsis (good-based desire - in a narrower notion of 'good' than that which connects desire more generally to the good); Aristotle's division of desires into rational and non-rational; Aristotle and some current views on desire; and the role of desire in Aristotle's moral psychology. The book will be of relevance to anyone interested in Aristotle's ethics or psychology"-- Provided by publisher

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Print version record.

Cover; Aristotle on Desire; Title; Copyright; CONTENTS; PREFACE; ABBREVIATIONS; INTRODUCTION; 1. General remarks; 2. Aristotle's desire terminology and some terms I shall leave untranslated; 3. The plan of this book; PART 1 DESIRES AND OBJECTS OF DESIRE; CHAPTER 1 THE RANGE OF STATES ARISTOTLE COUNTS AS DESIRES (OREXEIS); 1. Orexeis can be rational as well as non-rational; 2. Orexeis have a variety of 'objects', ontologically speaking; 3. Orexeis can be dispositional as well as occurrent; 4. Orexeis can be 'calm' as well as 'violent'; 5. Orexeis range over wants, hopes and idle wishes.

ConclusionCHAPTER 2 SOME GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT OBJECTS OF DESIRE (OREKTA) FOR ARISTOTLE; 1. What are objects of desire?; 2. Do all desires require envisaging prospects?; 3. Thought-based and phantasia-based desires; 4. Can perception envisage objects of desire, for Aristotle?; Conclusion; CHAPTER 3 DESIRE (OREXIS) AND THE GOOD; 1. De an. 3.10 on orexis and the good; 2. Two notions of 'good': broad and narrow; 3. What does Aristotle mean by 'apparent good'?; (a) EE 7.2; (b) NE 3.4; (c) Verdict; 4. What sort of error is being referred to?; Conclusion.

PART II ARISTOTLE'S CLASSIFICATIONS OF DESIRECHAPTER 4 SPECIES OF DESIRE I : EPITHUMIA (PLEASURE-BASED DESIRE); 1. A narrow notion of epithumia; 2. A broader notion of epithumia; 3. De re and de dicto objects of epithumia; Conclusion; CHAPTER 5 SPECIES OF DESIRE II: (RETALIATORY DESIRE); 1. Thumos and anger; 2. Thumos and courage; putative broader notions of thumos; (a) The Topics on the thumoeides; (b) A possible role for thumos in courage; (c) The Politics on thumos and friendship; 3. Thumos and 'the noble' (to kalon); Conclusion.

CHAPTER 6 SPECIES OF DESIRE III: BOULÊSIS (GOOD-BASED DESIRE)1. An outline of accounts linking boulêsis to eudaimonia; (a) An agent's conception of eudaimonia; (b) How a state such as boulêsis may be tied to an agent's conception of eudaimonia; 2. Reflective views linking boulêsis to an agent's conception of eudaimonia; (a) First problem: akrasia and idle wishes in tension; (b) Second problem: the virtuous agent; (c) Third problem: inverse akratics and enkratics; 3. The referential view that ties boulêsis to an agent's explicit conception of eudaimonia.

4. My non-eudaimonia-based account of the connection between boulêsis and the goodConclusion; CHAPTER 7 RATIONAL AND NON-RATIONAL DESIRE; 1. Thought-based versus non-thought-based desires; 2. Bodily versus non-bodily desires; 3. Desires that are responsive to a normative judgement versus those that are not so responsive; 4. Desires that are consequent upon deliberation versus those that are not so consequent; 5. Desires that require rationality to grasp their basic object versus those that do not so require rationality; Conclusion; Appendix: Deliberation and conscious processes.

English.

eBooks on EBSCOhost EBSCO eBook Subscription Academic Collection - Worldwide