Against obligation : the multiple sources of authority in a liberal democracy / Abner S. Greene.

By:

Greene, Abner, 1960- [author.]

Material type: Text

TextPublication details: Cambridge, Mass. ; London : Harvard University Press, 2012.Description: 1 online resource (viii, 333 pages)Content type:

text

Media type:

computer

Carrier type:

online resource

ISBN:

9780674069398
0674069390
9780674065178
0674065174

Other title:

Multiple sources of authority in a liberal democracy

Subject(s): Genre/Form:

Electronic books.

Additional physical formats: Print version:: Against obligation.DDC classification:

340/.112 23

LOC classification:

K240 .G74 2012eb

Online resources:

Click here to access online

Contents:

Against political obligation -- Accommodating our plural obligations -- Against interpretive obligation to the past -- Against interpretive obligation to the Supreme Court.

Summary: Do citizens of a nation such as the United States have a moral duty to obey the law? Do officials, when interpreting the Constitution, have an obligation to follow what that text meant when ratified? To follow precedent? To follow what the Supreme Court today says the Constitution means?These are questions of political obligation (for citizens) and interpretive obligation (for anyone interpreting the Constitution, often officials). Abner Greene argues that such obligations do not exist. Although citizens should obey some laws entirely, and other laws in some instances, no one has put forth a successful argument that citizens should obey all laws all the time. Greene's case is not only "against" obligation. It is also "for" an approach he calls "permeable sovereignty": all of our norms are on equal footing with the state's laws. Accordingly, the state should accommodate religious, philosophical, family, or tribal norms whenever possible. Greene shows that questions of interpretive obligation share many qualities with those of political obligation. In rejecting the view that constitutional interpreters must follow either prior or higher sources of constitutional meaning, Greene confronts and turns aside arguments similar to those offered for a moral duty of citizens to obey the law.Summary: Greene argues that citizens are not morally obligated to obey the law and that officials need not follow prior or higher authority when reading the Constitution. The sources of authority in a liberal democracy are multiple--the law must compete with other norms. Constitutional meaning is not locked in, historically or by the Supreme Court.

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Item type	Home library	Collection	Call number	Materials specified	Status	Date due	Barcode
Electronic-Books	OPJGU Sonepat- Campus	E-Books EBSCO			Available

Includes bibliographical references (pages 303-321) and index.

Against political obligation -- Accommodating our plural obligations -- Against interpretive obligation to the past -- Against interpretive obligation to the Supreme Court.

Print version record.

Do citizens of a nation such as the United States have a moral duty to obey the law? Do officials, when interpreting the Constitution, have an obligation to follow what that text meant when ratified? To follow precedent? To follow what the Supreme Court today says the Constitution means?These are questions of political obligation (for citizens) and interpretive obligation (for anyone interpreting the Constitution, often officials). Abner Greene argues that such obligations do not exist. Although citizens should obey some laws entirely, and other laws in some instances, no one has put forth a successful argument that citizens should obey all laws all the time. Greene's case is not only "against" obligation. It is also "for" an approach he calls "permeable sovereignty": all of our norms are on equal footing with the state's laws. Accordingly, the state should accommodate religious, philosophical, family, or tribal norms whenever possible. Greene shows that questions of interpretive obligation share many qualities with those of political obligation. In rejecting the view that constitutional interpreters must follow either prior or higher sources of constitutional meaning, Greene confronts and turns aside arguments similar to those offered for a moral duty of citizens to obey the law.

Greene argues that citizens are not morally obligated to obey the law and that officials need not follow prior or higher authority when reading the Constitution. The sources of authority in a liberal democracy are multiple--the law must compete with other norms. Constitutional meaning is not locked in, historically or by the Supreme Court.

English.

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