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Rational causation / Eric Marcus.

By: Material type: TextTextPublication details: Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 2012.Description: 1 online resource (ix, 266 pages)Content type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9780674068742
  • 0674068742
  • 9780674065338
  • 0674065336
Subject(s): Genre/Form: Additional physical formats: Print version:: Rational causation.DDC classification:
  • 122 23
LOC classification:
  • BD530 .M37 2012eb
Other classification:
  • CC 5500
Online resources:
Contents:
Introduction -- Rational explanation of belief -- Rational explanation of action -- (Non-human) animals and their reasons -- Rational explanation and rational causation -- Events and states -- Physicalism.
Summary: Contemporary philosophers of mind tend to explain rationality by viewing the mind as a kind of machine--the only alternative, it has seemed, to a ghostly supernatural explanation. Marcus rejects this choice as false and defends a third way--via rational causation, which draws on the theoretical and practical inferential abilities of human beings.Summary: We explain what people think and do by citing their reasons, but how do such explanations work, and what do they tell us about the nature of reality? Contemporary efforts to address these questions are often motivated by the worry that our ordinary conception of rationality contains a kernel of supernaturalism--a ghostly presence that meditates on sensory messages and orchestrates behavior on the basis of its ethereal calculations. In shunning this otherworldly conception, contemporary philosophers have focused on the project of "naturalizing" the mind, viewing it as a kind of machine that converts sensory input and bodily impulse into thought and action. Eric Marcus rejects this choice between physicalism and supernaturalism as false and defends a third way. He argues that philosophers have failed to take seriously the idea that rational explanations postulate a distinctive sort of causation--rational causation. Rational explanations do not reveal the same sorts of causal connections that explanations in the natural sciences do. Rather, rational causation draws on the theoretical and practical inferential abilities of human beings. Marcus defends this position against a wide array of physicalist arguments that have captivated philosophers of mind for decades. Along the way he provides novel views on, for example, the difference between rational and nonrational animals and the distinction between states and events
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Includes bibliographical references and index.

Introduction -- Rational explanation of belief -- Rational explanation of action -- (Non-human) animals and their reasons -- Rational explanation and rational causation -- Events and states -- Physicalism.

Print version record.

Contemporary philosophers of mind tend to explain rationality by viewing the mind as a kind of machine--the only alternative, it has seemed, to a ghostly supernatural explanation. Marcus rejects this choice as false and defends a third way--via rational causation, which draws on the theoretical and practical inferential abilities of human beings.

We explain what people think and do by citing their reasons, but how do such explanations work, and what do they tell us about the nature of reality? Contemporary efforts to address these questions are often motivated by the worry that our ordinary conception of rationality contains a kernel of supernaturalism--a ghostly presence that meditates on sensory messages and orchestrates behavior on the basis of its ethereal calculations. In shunning this otherworldly conception, contemporary philosophers have focused on the project of "naturalizing" the mind, viewing it as a kind of machine that converts sensory input and bodily impulse into thought and action. Eric Marcus rejects this choice between physicalism and supernaturalism as false and defends a third way. He argues that philosophers have failed to take seriously the idea that rational explanations postulate a distinctive sort of causation--rational causation. Rational explanations do not reveal the same sorts of causal connections that explanations in the natural sciences do. Rather, rational causation draws on the theoretical and practical inferential abilities of human beings. Marcus defends this position against a wide array of physicalist arguments that have captivated philosophers of mind for decades. Along the way he provides novel views on, for example, the difference between rational and nonrational animals and the distinction between states and events

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