Reburial of nonexistents : reconsidering the Meinong-Russell debate / Carolyn Swanson.

By:

Swanson, Carolyn

Material type: Text

TextSeries: Value inquiry book series. Central-European value studies ; ; 231.Publication details: Amsterdam ; New York, NY : Rodopi, 2011, ©2011.Description: 1 online resource (viii, 133 pages)Content type:

text

Media type:

computer

Carrier type:

online resource

ISBN:

9789401200615
9401200610
1283212781
9781283212786
9786613212788
6613212784

Subject(s): Genre/Form:

Additional physical formats: Print version:: Reburial of nonexistents.DDC classification:

111.5092

LOC classification:

BD219 .S93 2011eb

Online resources:

Click here to access online

Contents:

""Cover""; ""Title Page""; ""Copyright Page""; ""Table of Contents""; ""PREFACE""; ""INTRODUCTION""; ""Part One: THE MEINONGIAN EDIFICE: DID RUSSELL DESTROY IT?""; ""ONE Meinongâ€?s Theory and Rationale for Beingless Objects""; ""1. Subsistents""; ""2. Beingless Objects""; ""TWO Russellâ€?s Concern about Violated Logic Principles""; ""1. Russellâ€?s Criticism""; ""2. Wide and Narrow Negation""; ""3. Solution One: Wide and Narrow Versions of the LNC and LEM""; ""4. Solution Two: Indeterminate Objects""; ""5. Critique of Narrow Negation""; ""6. Return to Russellâ€?s Criticism""

""THREE Russellâ€?s Concern about Existential Implications""""1. Russellâ€?s Criticism""; ""2. Solution One: Exists and Existent""; ""3. Solution Two: Nuclear and Extranuclear Properties""; ""4. Return to Russellâ€?s Criticism""; ""FOUR Russellâ€?s Alternative to Beingless Objects""; ""1. Logical Form""; ""2. Sentences with Indefinite Descriptions""; ""3. Sentences with Definite Descriptions""; ""4. Sentences Making Existence Claims""; ""5. Descriptions and Occurrences""; ""6. Russellâ€?s Reconstructions as Alternatives to Beingless Objects""

""Part Two: THE PARADIGM FACTS: DO BEINGLESS OBJECTS EXPLAIN THEM?""""FIVE Characterization Facts""; ""1. Meinongâ€?s Characterization Facts and Isolated Objects""; ""2. Problems with Meinongâ€?s Analysis""; ""3. Russellâ€?s Approach to Characterization Sentences""; ""4. In Perspective""; ""SIX Negative Existential and Intentional Facts""; ""1. Negative Existential Facts""; ""2. Intentional Facts""; ""Part Three: THE FICTIONAL FACTS: A NEED FOR A NEW INTERPRETATION?""; ""SEVEN The Problems with Names""; ""1. Russell and Names""; ""2. Meinong and Names""; ""3. In Perspective""

""EIGHT The Need for Contextualization""""1. Contextualization Solution""; ""2. Context Operators""; ""3. Context Operators and Inferences""; ""4. In Perspective""; ""NINE The Final Verdict on Beingless Objects""; ""1. Fictional Characters Independent of Context""; ""2. Possible Objections""; ""3. The Final Verdict on Beingless Objects""; ""WORKS CITED""; ""ABOUT THE AUTHOR""; ""INDEX""

Summary: Alexius Meinong claimed to uncover a brave new world of nonexistent objects. He contended that unreal objects, such as the golden mountain and the round square, genuinely had properties (such as nonexistence itself) and therefore, deserved a place in an all-inclusive science. Meinong's notion of nonexistents was initially not well-received, largely due to the influence and criticisms of Bertrand Russell. However, it has gained considerable popularity in more recent years as academics have uncovered shortfalls in Russell's philosophy and strived to explain apparent "facts" about the beingless. Some philosophers have continued Meinong's project, further explaining nonexistent objects or formulating logic systems that incorporate them. The more recent developments beg for a re-examination of Meinongianism. This book does just that, putting the theory on trial. Part One considers if Russell truly defeated Meinongianism. It addresses Meinongian rejoinders in response to Russell's main criticisms and further defends Russell's alternative solution, his Theory of Descriptions. Part Two explores the rationale for nonexistents and their use in interpreting three types of statements: characterization, negative existential, and intentional. The book argues that, despite appearances, Meinongianism cannot plausibly account for its own paradigm claims, whereas Russell's framework, with some further elucidation, can explain these statements quite well. Part Three primarily addresses claims about fiction, exploring the short-comings of Meinongian and Russellian frameworks in interpreting them. The book introduces a contextualization solution and symbolic method for capturing the logical form of such claims - one with the complexity to handle cross-contextual statements, including negative existential and intentional ones. It finally considers where that leaves nonexistent objects, ultimately rejecting such so-called entities.

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Includes bibliographical references and index.

Print version record.

Alexius Meinong claimed to uncover a brave new world of nonexistent objects. He contended that unreal objects, such as the golden mountain and the round square, genuinely had properties (such as nonexistence itself) and therefore, deserved a place in an all-inclusive science. Meinong's notion of nonexistents was initially not well-received, largely due to the influence and criticisms of Bertrand Russell. However, it has gained considerable popularity in more recent years as academics have uncovered shortfalls in Russell's philosophy and strived to explain apparent "facts" about the beingless. Some philosophers have continued Meinong's project, further explaining nonexistent objects or formulating logic systems that incorporate them. The more recent developments beg for a re-examination of Meinongianism. This book does just that, putting the theory on trial. Part One considers if Russell truly defeated Meinongianism. It addresses Meinongian rejoinders in response to Russell's main criticisms and further defends Russell's alternative solution, his Theory of Descriptions. Part Two explores the rationale for nonexistents and their use in interpreting three types of statements: characterization, negative existential, and intentional. The book argues that, despite appearances, Meinongianism cannot plausibly account for its own paradigm claims, whereas Russell's framework, with some further elucidation, can explain these statements quite well. Part Three primarily addresses claims about fiction, exploring the short-comings of Meinongian and Russellian frameworks in interpreting them. The book introduces a contextualization solution and symbolic method for capturing the logical form of such claims - one with the complexity to handle cross-contextual statements, including negative existential and intentional ones. It finally considers where that leaves nonexistent objects, ultimately rejecting such so-called entities.

English.

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