Liberal perfectionism : the reasons that goodness gives / Alexandra Couto.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Print version record.

0 Introduction; 0.1 The Rejection of Neutrality; 0.2 Why the Rejection of Neutrality is not Enough; 0.3 Basic Features and Definitions of Perfectionism; 0.4 Re-conceptualisation of the Differences between Neutralist and Perfectionist Liberals; 0.5 Summary of the Argument of the Book; 1 Perfectionism: Some Basic Distinctions; 1.1 Defining Ethical Perfectionism, Prudential Perfectionism and Political Perfectionism; 1.2 Why Political Perfectionism Requires an Account of Ethical Perfectionism; 1.3 Prudential Perfectionism and Objective Goods.

1.4 Arguments for the Objective List Conception of Well-Being1.5 The Step from Prudential Perfectionism to Ethical Perfectionism; 1.6 The Step from Ethical Perfectionism to Political Perfectionism; 1.7 Conclusion; 2 Perfectionist Goods; 2.1 Basic Terminology; 2.2 What Should we include in our List of Objective Goods?; 2.2.1 Too Sparse; 2.2.2 Refer to goods that are not fundamental; 2.2.3 Contain too many goods; 2.2.4 A Plausible List of Objective Goods; 2.3 Realizing Goods vs. Opportunities; 2.4 Agency and Good; 2.5 Bringing Back Perspective for a Perfectionist Renaissance.

2.5.1 There is Something about Perspective2.5.2 Endorsement Distinctions; 2.5.3 Well-being; 2.6 Does Perfectionism require a Unifying Account of the Good?; 2.7 Could Perfectionism be based on Cultural Norms or on an Overlapping Consensus?; 2.8 Is the Lack of Unifying Account Damaging for Political Perfectionism?; 2.9 Conclusion; 3 Ethical Perfectionism: Distinctions and Objections; 3.1 Ethical Perfectionism as a Family of Theories; 3.1.1 Exclusive vs. Non-exclusive Perfectionism; 3.1.2 Pluralist vs. Monist Perfectionism; 3.1.3 Broad vs. Narrow Perfectionism.

3.1.4 Satisficing vs. Maximising Perfectionism3.1.5 Absolute vs. Relative Perfectionism; 3.2 Consequentialist, Virtue Ethics and Deontological Perfectionism; 3.3 Is Perfectionism too Self-indulgent?; 3.4 Praise and Blame; 3.5 Perfectionism and Positive Value; 3.6 Conclusion; 4 The Reasons that Goodness Gives; 4.1 Prima Facie Arguments; 4.2 Well-Being and the Function of the State: The Crude Argument; 4.3 The Service and Well-Being Argument; 4.4 Is the Humanistic Principle necessary for the Service and Well-Being Argument?; 4.5 An Objection to the Social Forms Thesis.

4.6 The Service and Practical Reason Argument: The Explicit Version4.7 An Objection to the Service and Practical Reason Argument: Agentneutral vs Agent-relative Reasons; 4.7.1 The Objection; 4.7.2 Agent-relative Reasons in our Lives; 4.8 The Revised Service and Practical Reason Argument; 4.9 A Meta-ethical Objection; 4.10 An Objection to the Service Conception of Authority; 4.11 Conclusion; 5 The Consistency Argument; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 Charles Taylor's Argument; 5.3 Vinit Haksar's Argument; 5.4 The Consistency Argument; 5.5 The Protection of Individual Rights and Interests.

Literature on political perfectionism has often mainly focused on dealing with objections. This book highlights the intuitive appeal of liberal perfectionism. Many objections to perfectionism are shown to fail to reach their target once appropriate distinctions are drawn and a plausible form of liberal perfectionism is endorsed. More surprisingly, Couto suggests that perfectionism might be compatible with the concept of social justice.

In English.

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