Theories of Scientific Method : an Introduction.

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Cover; Half Title; Title; Copyright; Contents; Abbreviations; Acknowledgements; Introduction; I The idea of methodology; 1 What is this thing called scientific method?; 1.1 Different methodological practices within the sciences; 1.2 Methodology and clinical trials; 1.3 Methodology within the context of discovery and the context of justification; 1.4 Methods for discovery; 1.5 Heuristics as methodology; 1.6 Scientific method and the methodology of logic; 2 Theoretical values in science; 2.1 Aims of science and scientists; 2.2 A broad classification of kinds of value.

2.3 Some virtues of scientific theories2.4 Kuhn on values; 2.5 Aims and values of science: Popper; 2.6 Aims and values of science: Duhem; 2.7 Epistemic and pragmatic values; 3 Rules and principles of method; 3.1 Values, rules and principles of method; 3.2 Some features of principles of method; 3.3 Methodological principles from the history of science, I: Descartes; 3.4 Methodological principles from the history of science, II: Newton; 3.5 Methodological principles from the history of science, III: Duhem; 4 Metamethodology.

4.1 A three-tiered relationship between science, methods and metamethods4.2 Metamethodology: what is it and is it possible?; 4.3 A priori, empirical and expressivist approaches to metamethodology; 4.4 The metamethodology of reflective equilibrium; 4.5 The historical turn, methods and metamethods; II Inductive and hypothetico-deductive methods; 5 Induction in science; 5.1 Deduction and induction; 5.2 From induction to probability and confirmation; 5.3 Enumerative induction; 5.4 The rule of inference to the best explanation; 5.5 The problem of grue; 5.6 Simplicity of equations.

5.7 Simplicity and curve-fitting6 Some justifications of induction; 6.1 Attempting a justification of deduction; 6.2 A sceptical argument against the justification of induction; 6.3 The inductivist justification of induction; 6.4 The pragmatic vindication of induction; 6.5 Externalism and the warrant for induction; 7 The hypothetico-deductive method; 7.1 The structure of the H-D method; 7.2 Refinements of, and problems for, the H-D method; 7.3 Problems for H-D confirmation; 7.4 Appendix on some paradoxical results of confirmation theory; III Probability and scientific method.

8 Probability, Bayesianism and methodology8.1 Principles and theorems of probability; 8.2 Bayes's theorem in some of its forms; 8.3 Bayesian confirmation; 8.4 The H-D method in a Bayesian context; 8.5 Subjective degree of belief as a probability; 8.6 Metamethodological justification and the Dutch book theorem; 8.7 Bayesian conditionalization and pure subjective Bayesianism; 9 Bayesianism: applications and problems; 9.1 The problem of priors; 9.2 Is Bayesianism complete?; 9.3 New evidence and the problem of old evidence; 9.4 Kuhnian values and Bayesianism.

9.5 Bayesianism and inference to the best explanation.

What is it to be scientific? Is there such a thing as scientific method? And if so, how might such methods be justified? Robert Nola and Howard Sankey seek to provide answers to these fundamental questions in their exploration of the major recent theories of scientific method. Although for many scientists their understanding of method is something they just pick up in the course of being trained, Nola and Sankey argue that it is possible to be explicit about what this tacit understanding of method is, rather than leave it as some unfathomable mystery. They robustly defend the idea that there i.

English.

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