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Building the judiciary : law, courts, and the politics of institutional development / Justin Crowe.

By: Material type: TextTextSeries: Princeton studies in American politicsPublisher: Princeton : Princeton University Press, [2012]Copyright date: ©2012Description: 1 online resource (xvi, 296 pages) illustrationsContent type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9781400842575
  • 1400842573
Other title:
  • Law, courts, and the politics of institutional development
Subject(s): Genre/Form: Additional physical formats: Print version:: Building the Judiciary : Law, Courts, and the Politics of Institutional Development.DDC classification:
  • 347.73109
LOC classification:
  • KF8719 .C786 2012
Online resources:
Contents:
The puzzle of judicial institution building -- The early republic : establishment -- Jeffersonian and Jacksonian democracy : reorganization -- The Civil War and reconstruction : empowerment -- The gilded age and the progressive era : restructuring -- The interwar and new deal years : bureaucratization -- Modern America : specialization -- Judicial power in a political world.
Summary: How did the federal judiciary transcend early limitations to become a powerful institution of American governance? How did the Supreme Court move from political irrelevance to political centrality? This book uncovers the causes and consequences of judicial institution-building in the United States from the commencement of the new government in 1789 through the close of the twentieth century. Explaining why and how the federal judiciary became an independent, autonomous, and powerful political institution, Justin Crowe moves away from the notion that the judiciary is exceptional in the scheme of American politics, illustrating instead how it is subject to the same architectonic politics as other political institutions. Arguing that judicial institution-building is fundamentally based on a series of contested questions regarding institutional design and delegation, Crowe develops a theory to explain why political actors seek to build the judiciary and the conditions under which they are successful. He both demonstrates how the motivations of institution-builders ranged from substantive policy to partisan and electoral politics to judicial performance, and details how reform was often provoked by substantial changes in the political universe or transformational entrepreneurship by political leaders. Embedding case studies of landmark institution-building episodes within a contextual understanding of each era under consideration, Crowe presents a historically rich narrative that offers analytically grounded explanations for why judicial institution-building was pursued, how it was accomplished, and what--in the broader scheme of American constitutional democracy--it achieved.
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Includes footnotes with bibliographical references, and index.

The puzzle of judicial institution building -- The early republic : establishment -- Jeffersonian and Jacksonian democracy : reorganization -- The Civil War and reconstruction : empowerment -- The gilded age and the progressive era : restructuring -- The interwar and new deal years : bureaucratization -- Modern America : specialization -- Judicial power in a political world.

How did the federal judiciary transcend early limitations to become a powerful institution of American governance? How did the Supreme Court move from political irrelevance to political centrality? This book uncovers the causes and consequences of judicial institution-building in the United States from the commencement of the new government in 1789 through the close of the twentieth century. Explaining why and how the federal judiciary became an independent, autonomous, and powerful political institution, Justin Crowe moves away from the notion that the judiciary is exceptional in the scheme of American politics, illustrating instead how it is subject to the same architectonic politics as other political institutions. Arguing that judicial institution-building is fundamentally based on a series of contested questions regarding institutional design and delegation, Crowe develops a theory to explain why political actors seek to build the judiciary and the conditions under which they are successful. He both demonstrates how the motivations of institution-builders ranged from substantive policy to partisan and electoral politics to judicial performance, and details how reform was often provoked by substantial changes in the political universe or transformational entrepreneurship by political leaders. Embedding case studies of landmark institution-building episodes within a contextual understanding of each era under consideration, Crowe presents a historically rich narrative that offers analytically grounded explanations for why judicial institution-building was pursued, how it was accomplished, and what--in the broader scheme of American constitutional democracy--it achieved.

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