Political power and corporate control : the new global politics of corporate governance / Peter Alexis Gourevitch and James J. Shinn.
Material type:![Text](/opac-tmpl/lib/famfamfam/BK.png)
- text
- computer
- online resource
- 9781400837014
- 1400837014
- 0691122911
- 9780691122915
- Political power & corporate control [Spine title]
- Global politics of corporate governance
- Corporate governance
- Corporations -- Investor relations
- Business and politics
- Corporations -- Political activity
- International finance
- Gouvernement d'entreprise
- Sociétés -- Relations avec les actionnaires
- Affaires et politique
- Sociétés -- Activité politique
- Finances internationales
- BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- Industries -- General
- BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- Government & Business
- Business and politics
- Corporate governance
- Corporations -- Investor relations
- Corporations -- Political activity
- International finance
- Corporate governance
- Regulering
- Corporate Governance
- BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- Industries -- General
- BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- Government & Business
- Corporate governance
- Regulering
- Corporate Governance
- 338.6+ 22
- HD2741 .G677 2005eb
- 85.05
- QP 341
Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Materials specified | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
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OPJGU Sonepat- Campus | E-Books EBSCO | Available |
Introduction and summary argument -- Governance patterns: what causes what? -- Framing incentives: the economics and law tradition -- Politics: preferences and institutions -- Preference cleavages 1: class conflict -- Preference cleavages 2: sectoral conflict -- Preference cleavages 3: transparency, voice, and pensions -- Conclusion : going forward.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 313-332) and index.
"Why does corporate governance--front page news with the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat--vary so dramatically around the world? This book explains how politics shapes corporate governance--how managers, shareholders, and workers jockey for advantage in setting the rules by which companies are run, and for whom they are run. It combines a clear theoretical model on this political interaction, with statistical evidence from thirty-nine countries of Europe, Asia, Africa, and North and South America and detailed narratives of country cases. This book differs from most treatments by explaining differences in minority shareholder protections and ownership concentration among countries in terms of the interaction of economic preferences and political institutions. It explores in particular the crucial role of pension plans and financial intermediaries in shaping political preferences for different rules of corporate governance."--Publisher's description.
Print version record.
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