The Ottoman road to war in 1914 : the Ottoman Empire and the First World War / Mustafa Aksakal.

By:

Aksakal, Mustafa, 1973-

Material type: Text

TextSeries: Cambridge military historiesPublication details: Cambridge, UK ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2008.Description: 1 online resource (xv, 216 pages) : illustrations, mapsContent type:

text

Media type:

computer

Carrier type:

online resource

ISBN:

9780511551987
0511551983
9780511465062
0511465068
0511464320
9780511464324
9780521175258
0521175259
1107199506
9781107199507
0511736886
9780511736889
1281982482
9781281982483
9786611982485
6611982485
0511462743
9780511462740
0511461992
9780511461996
0511463537
9780511463532

Subject(s):

Genre/Form:

Additional physical formats: Print version:: Ottoman road to war in 1914.DDC classification:

940.3/56 22

LOC classification:

DR588 .A39 2008eb

Online resources:

Click here to access online

Contents:

Introduction : pursuing sovereignty in the age of imperialism -- The intellectual and emotional climate after the Balkan Wars -- 1914 : war with Greece? -- The Ottomans within the international order -- The Great War as great opportunity : the Ottoman July crisis -- Tug of war : Penelope's game -- Salvation through war? -- Conclusion : the decision for war remembered.

Summary: "Why did the Ottoman Empire enter the First World War in late October 1914, months after the war's devastations had become clear? Were its leaders 'simple-minded, ' 'below-average' individuals, as the doyen of Turkish diplomatic history has argued? Or, as others have claimed, did the Ottomans enter the war because War Minister Enver Pasha, dictating Ottoman decisions, was in thrall to the Germans and to his own expansionist dreams? Based on previously untapped Ottoman and European sources, Mustafa Aksakal's dramatic study challenges this consensus. It demonstrates that responsibility went far beyond Enver, that the road to war was paved by the demands of a politically interested public, and that the Ottoman leadership sought the German alliance as the only way out of a web of international threats and domestic insecurities, opting for an escape whose catastrophic consequences for the empire and seismic impact on the Middle East are felt even today."--Publisher's description.

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Item type	Home library	Collection	Call number	Materials specified	Status	Date due	Barcode
Electronic-Books	OPJGU Sonepat- Campus	E-Books EBSCO			Available

Includes bibliographical references (pages 195-207) and index.

"Why did the Ottoman Empire enter the First World War in late October 1914, months after the war's devastations had become clear? Were its leaders 'simple-minded, ' 'below-average' individuals, as the doyen of Turkish diplomatic history has argued? Or, as others have claimed, did the Ottomans enter the war because War Minister Enver Pasha, dictating Ottoman decisions, was in thrall to the Germans and to his own expansionist dreams? Based on previously untapped Ottoman and European sources, Mustafa Aksakal's dramatic study challenges this consensus. It demonstrates that responsibility went far beyond Enver, that the road to war was paved by the demands of a politically interested public, and that the Ottoman leadership sought the German alliance as the only way out of a web of international threats and domestic insecurities, opting for an escape whose catastrophic consequences for the empire and seismic impact on the Middle East are felt even today."--Publisher's description.