Designing federalism : a theory of self-sustainable federal institutions / Mikhail Filippov, Peter C. Ordeshook, Olga Shvetsova.
Material type:![Text](/opac-tmpl/lib/famfamfam/BK.png)
- text
- computer
- online resource
- 0511184611
- 9780511184611
- 0511186312
- 9780511186318
- 321.02/3 22
- JC355 .F55 2004eb
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OPJGU Sonepat- Campus | E-Books EBSCO | Available |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Print version record.
Cover; Half-title; Title; Copyright; Contents; Figures; Tables; Preface; Acknowledgments; 1 Federations and the Theoretical Problem; 2 Federal Bargaining; 3 Two Cases of Uninstitutionalized Bargaining; 4 Representation; 5 Incentives; 6 Political Parties in a Federal State; 7 Institutional Sources of Federal Stability I; 8 Institutional Sources of Federal Stability II; 9 Designing Federalism; References; Name Index; Subject Index.
The authors argue that rather than any carefully delineated allocation of policy jurisdictions, a number of institutional variables not normally associated with federal design (the content of regional charters and the extent to which public offices are filled by election rather than appointment) can be critical to determining federal success.
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