Rational herds : economic models of social learning / Christophe P. Chamley.
Material type:![Text](/opac-tmpl/lib/famfamfam/BK.png)
- text
- computer
- online resource
- 0511165978
- 9780511165979
- 0511165382
- 9780511165382
- 9780511616372
- 0511616376
- 9780511164828
- 0511164823
- 1280437545
- 9781280437540
- 9786610437542
- 6610437548
- 1107146364
- 9781107146365
- 0511312865
- 9780511312861
- Economic models of social learning
- Social learning
- Social learning -- Mathematical models
- Decision making
- Collective behavior
- Decision Making
- Mass Behavior
- Apprentissage social
- Apprentissage social -- Modèles mathématiques
- Prise de décision
- Comportement collectif
- decision making
- SOCIAL SCIENCE -- General
- Collective behavior
- Decision making
- Social learning
- Soziales Lernen
- Kollektives Verhalten
- Mathematisches Modell
- Sociaal leren
- Wiskundige modellen
- Aprendizagem social
- Aprendizagem social (modelos matemáticos)
- Tomada de decisão
- Comportamento coletivo
- 303.3/2 22
- HQ783 .C47 2004eb
- 77.61
- QH 300
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OPJGU Sonepat- Campus | E-Books EBSCO | Available |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 385-394) and indexes.
Print version record.
1. Introduction -- Part I. Social learning : 2. Bayesian tools : The bayesian framework ; Binary and Gaussian information ; Private signals and beliefs ; Martingales -- 3. Social learning with a common memory : A canonical model of social learning ; Efficient learning ; Observation noise ; Extensions -- 4. Cascades and herds : The basic model of herding ; The standard model with bounded beliefs ; The convergence of beliefs ; Herds and the slow convergence of beliefs ; Pricing the informational externality ; Crashes and booms -- 5. Limited memories : The sequential model with sampling ; The welfare-improving principle ; Sampling in a very large population ; Social learning or sampling in a large population? -- 6. Delays : The simplest model ; A general model with heterogeneous beliefs ; Properties -- 7. More delays : The length of a period ; Continuous times ; Buildup of private information ; Observation of payoffs -- 8. Outcomes : Incomplete learning ; The determinant of economic success: luck or effort? ; Complete learning with a diversity of private beliefs -- 9. Networks and diffusion : Optimization and diffusion of innovations ; Learning in networks -- 10. Words : Advice by one expert ; Larger sets of states and messages ; Panel of experts ; The receiver does not make the evaluation -- Part II. Coordination : 11. Guessing to coordinate : Overview ; Eductive stability in a standard market ; Strategic complementarities ; Speculative attacks against a fixed exchange rate -- 12. Learning to coordinate : A distribution with a cluster ; Observation noise -- 13. Delays and payoff externalities : Strategic substitutability ; Strategic complementaries -- Part III. Financial herding : 14.l Sequences of financial trades : Learning in the model of Glosten and Milgrom ; Herds ; Avalanches ; Herding in auctions -- 15. Gaussian financial markets : Actions in the CARA-Gauss model ; Markets ; The convergence of beliefs ; Multiple equilibria, crashes, and booms -- 16. Financial frenzies : Speculative attacks against a fixed exchange rate ; Information delays in financial markets ; The crash of a bubble.
This book is the first in the exciting new field of social learning.
English.
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