Empowering exporters : reciprocity, delegation, and collective action in American trade policy / Michael J. Gilligan.

Includes bibliographical references (pages 167-178) and index.

Michael Gilligan argues that the liberalization of trade policy has succeeded because it has been reciprocal with liberalization in other countries solving the collective action problems of supporters of free trade. Our trade barriers have been reduced as an explicit quid pro quo for reduction of trade barriers in other countries. Reciprocity, Gilligan argues, gives exporters the incentive to support free trade policies because it gives them a clear gain from free trade and thus enables the exporters to overcome collective action problems. The lobbying by exporters, balancing the interests of groups seeking protection, changes the preferences of political leaders in favor of more liberalization. Gilligan tests his theory in a detailed exploration of the history of American trade policy as well as in quantitative analysis showing increases in the demand for liberalization as the result of reciprocity in trade legislation from 1890 to the present. Empowering Exporters should appeal to political scientists, economists, and policymakers who want to understand the political underpinnings of American trade policy.

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Contents -- Preface -- 1. Introduction -- I. Theory -- 2. Reciprocal Trade Agreements and the Demand for Liberalization -- 3. Reciprocity and Congressional Delegation -- II. Historical Overview -- 4. Reciprocity and American Trade Policy, 1890�1994 -- III. Quantitative Evidence -- 5. Estimating the Demand for Liberalization and Protection, 1890�1937 -- 6. The Demand for Liberalization and Protection Today -- 7. Conclusion -- Appendixes -- A. Derivation of Real Income Effects from Reciprocal and Unilateral Liberalization -- B. Comparative Statistics

C. Effects of Two-Thirds Majority and Gatekeeping PowerD. Data Sources -- References -- Index

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