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The new sovereignty : compliance with international regulatory agreements / Abram Chayes, Antonia Handler Chayes.

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextPublication details: Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1995.Description: 1 online resource (xii, 417 pages)Content type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9780674029453
  • 0674029453
  • 9780674262638
  • 0674262638
Subject(s): Genre/Form: Additional physical formats: Print version:: New sovereignty.DDC classification:
  • 341.3/7 20
LOC classification:
  • KZ1301 .C48 1995
  • JX4165 .C43 1995
Other classification:
  • 86.85
  • KC133
  • PR 2207
Online resources:
Contents:
1. A Theory of Compliance -- pt. I. Sanctions. 2. Treaty-Based Military and Economic Sanctions. 3. Membership Sanctions. 4. Unilateral Sanctions -- pt. II. Toward a Strategy for Managing Compliance. 5. Norms. 6. Transparency, Norms, and Strategic Interaction. 7. Reporting and Data Collection. 8. Verification and Monitoring. 9. Instruments of Active Management. 10. Policy Review and Assessment. 11. Nongovernmental Organizations. 12. Revitalizing International Organizations -- Appendix: List of Treaties.
Action note:
  • digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve
Summary: In an increasingly complex and interdependent world, states resort to a bewildering array of regulatory agreements to deal with problems as disparate as climate change, nuclear proliferation, international trade, satellite communications, species destruction, and intellectual property. In such a system, there must be some means of ensuring reasonably reliable performance of treaty obligations. The standard approach to this problem, taken by academics and politicians alike, is to search for treaties with "teeth"--Military or economic sanctions to deter and punish violationSummary: The New Sovereignty argues that this approach is misconceived. Cases of coercive enforcement are rare, and sanctions are too costly and difficult to mobilize to be a reliable enforcement tool. As an alternative to this "enforcement" model, the authors propose a "managerial" model for ensuring treaty compliance. It relies on the elaboration and application of treaty norms in a continuing dialogue among the parties, international officials, and nongovernmental organizations - and it is this dialogue that generates pressure to resolve problems of noncompliance. In the process, the norms and practices of the regime themselves evolve and develop
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Includes bibliographical references (pages 303-404) and index.

1. A Theory of Compliance -- pt. I. Sanctions. 2. Treaty-Based Military and Economic Sanctions. 3. Membership Sanctions. 4. Unilateral Sanctions -- pt. II. Toward a Strategy for Managing Compliance. 5. Norms. 6. Transparency, Norms, and Strategic Interaction. 7. Reporting and Data Collection. 8. Verification and Monitoring. 9. Instruments of Active Management. 10. Policy Review and Assessment. 11. Nongovernmental Organizations. 12. Revitalizing International Organizations -- Appendix: List of Treaties.

In an increasingly complex and interdependent world, states resort to a bewildering array of regulatory agreements to deal with problems as disparate as climate change, nuclear proliferation, international trade, satellite communications, species destruction, and intellectual property. In such a system, there must be some means of ensuring reasonably reliable performance of treaty obligations. The standard approach to this problem, taken by academics and politicians alike, is to search for treaties with "teeth"--Military or economic sanctions to deter and punish violation

The New Sovereignty argues that this approach is misconceived. Cases of coercive enforcement are rare, and sanctions are too costly and difficult to mobilize to be a reliable enforcement tool. As an alternative to this "enforcement" model, the authors propose a "managerial" model for ensuring treaty compliance. It relies on the elaboration and application of treaty norms in a continuing dialogue among the parties, international officials, and nongovernmental organizations - and it is this dialogue that generates pressure to resolve problems of noncompliance. In the process, the norms and practices of the regime themselves evolve and develop

Print version record.

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Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010. MiAaHDL

Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. MiAaHDL

http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212

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English.

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