Aiming at virtue in Plato / Iakovos Vasiliou.

By:

Vasiliou, Iakovos, 1966-

Material type: Text

TextPublisher: Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press, 2008Description: 1 online resource (x, 311 pages)Content type:

text

Media type:

computer

Carrier type:

online resource

ISBN:

9780511454714
0511454716
9780511455742
0511455747
9780511482687
051148268X
9780511457708
0511456395
9780511456398
0511457707
1107196752
9781107196759
1281945021
9781281945020
9786611945022
6611945024
0521862965
9780521862967
9780521367943
0521367948

Subject(s):

Genre/Form:

Electronic books.

Additional physical formats: Print version:: Aiming at virtue in Plato.DDC classification:

170.92 22 22

LOC classification:

B398.V57 V37 2008eb

Online resources:

Click here to access online

Contents:

Socrates and the supremacy of virtue -- Determining virtue in the here and now: -- The supremacy of virtue in the Gorgias -- Trying (and failing) to determine what virtue is -- Socrates and Thrasymachus : Republic I -- The benefits of injustice -- Early education and non-philosophers in the republic -- Aiming at virtue and determining what it is.

Summary: This study of Plato's ethics focuses on the concept of virtue. Based on detailed readings of the most prominent Platonic dialogues on virtue, it argues that there is a central yet previously unnoticed conceptual distinction in Plato between the idea of virtue as the supreme aim of one's actions and the determination of which action-tokens or -types are virtuous. Appreciating the 'aiming/determining distinction' provides detailed and mutually consistent readings of the most well-known Platonic dialogues on virtue as well as original interpretations of central Platonic questions. Unlike most examinations of Plato's ethics, this study does not take as its centrepiece the 'eudaimonist framework', which focuses on the relationship between virtue and happiness. Instead, it argues that the dialogues themselves begin with the idea of the supremacy of virtue, examine how that claim can be defended, and address how to determine what constitutes the virtuous action.

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Item type	Home library	Collection	Call number	Materials specified	Status	Date due	Barcode
Electronic-Books	OPJGU Sonepat- Campus	E-Books EBSCO			Available

Includes bibliographical references and indexes.

This study of Plato's ethics focuses on the concept of virtue. Based on detailed readings of the most prominent Platonic dialogues on virtue, it argues that there is a central yet previously unnoticed conceptual distinction in Plato between the idea of virtue as the supreme aim of one's actions and the determination of which action-tokens or -types are virtuous. Appreciating the 'aiming/determining distinction' provides detailed and mutually consistent readings of the most well-known Platonic dialogues on virtue as well as original interpretations of central Platonic questions. Unlike most examinations of Plato's ethics, this study does not take as its centrepiece the 'eudaimonist framework', which focuses on the relationship between virtue and happiness. Instead, it argues that the dialogues themselves begin with the idea of the supremacy of virtue, examine how that claim can be defended, and address how to determine what constitutes the virtuous action.