Consciousness, function, and representation / Ned Block.

"A Bradford book."

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Functionalism -- 2. What is functionalism? -- 3. What psychological states are not, with J. Fodor -- 4. Troubles with functionalism -- 5. What intuitions about Homunculi Do Not Sho -- 6. Consciousness -- 7. Review of Daniel Dennett, consciousness explained -- 8. What is Dennett's theory a theory of? -- 9. On a confusion about a function of consciousness -- 10. How many concepts of consciousness? -- 11. Biology versus computation in the study of consciousness -- 12. Ridiculing social constructivism about phenomenal consciousness -- 13. Concepts of consciousness -- 14. How not to find the neural correlate of consciousness -- 15. Paradox and cross-purposes in recent work on consciousness -- 16. Spatial perception via tactile sensation -- 17. Two neural correlates of consciousness -- 18. Review of Alva Noe¿, action in perception -- 19. Are absent qualia impossible? -- 20. The harder problem of consciousness -- 21. Max Black's objection to mind-body identity -- 22. Qualia -- 23. Inverted earth -- 24. Mental paint -- 25. Sexism, racism, ageism, and the nature of consciousness -- 26. Is experiencing just representing? -- 27. Bodily sensations as an obstacle for representationism.

Print version record.

Annotation The first of a planned two-volume collection of Ned Block's writings on philosophy of mind; this volume treats consciousness, functionalism, and representation and can be regarded as Block's most complete statement of his positions on consciousness.

English.

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