The political regulation wave : a case of how local incentives systematically shape air quality in China / Shiran Victoria Shen.

By:

Shen, Shiran Victoria, 1989- [author.]

Material type: Text

TextSeries: Cambridge studies on environment, energy and natural resource governancePublisher: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2022Description: 1 online resource (xx, 141 pages) : digital, PDF file(s)Content type:

text

Media type:

computer

Carrier type:

online resource

ISBN:

9781009103664 (ebook)

Subject(s):

Additional physical formats: Print version: : No titleDDC classification:

363.739/2 23/eng/20220218

LOC classification:

TD883.7.C6 S54 2022

Online resources:

Click here to access online

Contents:

Introduction : an inconvenient truth -- Theory of the political regulation wave -- Local governance in China -- The case of sulfur dioxide control -- The case of fine particulate matter control -- The tradeoffs of the political regulation wave -- Conclusion : rethinking governance.

Summary: Why has there been uneven success in reducing air pollution even in the same locality over time? This book offers an innovative theorization of how local political incentives can affect bureaucratic regulation. Using empirical evidence, it examines and compares the control of different air pollutants in China-an autocracy-and, to a lesser extent, Mexico-a democracy. Making use of new data, approaches, and techniques across political science, environmental sciences, and engineering, Shen reveals that local leaders and politicians are incentivized to cater to the policy preferences of their superiors or constituents, respectively, giving rise to varying levels of regulatory stringency during the leaders' tenures. Shen demonstrates that when ambiguity dilutes regulatory effectiveness, having the right incentives and enhanced monitoring is insufficient for successful policy implementation. Vividly explaining key phenomena through anecdotes and personal interviews, this book identifies new causes of air pollution and proposes timely solutions. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

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Item type	Home library	Collection	Call number	Materials specified	Status	Date due	Barcode
Electronic-Books	OPJGU Sonepat- Campus	E-Books Open Access			Available

Open Access.

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 21 Mar 2022).

Why has there been uneven success in reducing air pollution even in the same locality over time? This book offers an innovative theorization of how local political incentives can affect bureaucratic regulation. Using empirical evidence, it examines and compares the control of different air pollutants in China-an autocracy-and, to a lesser extent, Mexico-a democracy. Making use of new data, approaches, and techniques across political science, environmental sciences, and engineering, Shen reveals that local leaders and politicians are incentivized to cater to the policy preferences of their superiors or constituents, respectively, giving rise to varying levels of regulatory stringency during the leaders' tenures. Shen demonstrates that when ambiguity dilutes regulatory effectiveness, having the right incentives and enhanced monitoring is insufficient for successful policy implementation. Vividly explaining key phenomena through anecdotes and personal interviews, this book identifies new causes of air pollution and proposes timely solutions. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

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