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Fighting for credibility : US reputation and international politics / Frank P. Harvey and John Mitton.

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextPublisher: Toronto : University of Toronto Press, [2017]Copyright date: ©2017Description: 1 online resourceContent type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9781487511753
  • 1487511752
Subject(s): Genre/Form: Additional physical formats: Print version:: Fighting for credibility.DDC classification:
  • 327.73 23
LOC classification:
  • E183.7
Online resources:
Contents:
Cover; Contents; Acknowledgments; Introduction ; Chemical Weapons in Syria, 2012-13 ; Credibility and International Politics: The Case for Reputations; Credibility and International Politics: The Case against Reputations; Coercive Outcome in Syria ; Syria as a Deterrence/Compellence "Success"? ; Postscript ; Outline and Objectives.
1 Reputations Research and Premature Closure of Inquiry The Press-Mercer-Hopf Consensus ; 1.1 Hopf (1994) "Peripheral Visions" ; 1.2 Press (2005) "Calculating Credibility" ; 1.3 Mercer (1996) "Reputation and International Politics" ; Premature Closure of Inquiry: An Illustration.
1.4 Application of P-M-H Consensus Excludes Important Research on International ReputationsThe Missing Scholarship ; Conclusion ; 2 Reputations Matter: Rational Deterrence Theory and Credibility Reconsidered; 2.1 Four Core Prerequisites of Credible Coercive Threats ; RDT and Necessity and Sufficiency; Reassessing Fearon ; 2.2 Reputations and Imperfect Information.
2.3 Similarity and Transferability of Reputations and Credibility2.4 Reputations and Miscalculations ; 2.5 General versus Specific Reputations; 2.6 Reputations, Credibility, and Transferability Are in the Eyes of the Beholder; Conclusion ; 3 US Reputation Building in Deterrence Encounters, 1991-2003 ; Case 1 -- Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-5) ; Case 2 -- Kosovo (1998-9).
Case 3 -- Iraq (1991-2003) Conclusion ; 4 The Strategic Logic of US Coercion: Explaining Deterrence Failures and Successes in Syria, 2011-13; 4.1 Defining Success in Syria; 4.2 Syria: RDT versus P-M-H ; US Reputations and Past Actions ; Escalation and Mission Creep ; 4.3 Protracted Crises, Probes, and Tipping Points ; Assad's Miscalculations.
4.4 Credibility Paradox -- Punishments and Promises.
Summary: "When Bashar al-Assad used chemical weapons against his own people in Syria, he clearly crossed President Barack Obama's "red line." At the time, many argued that the president had to bomb in order to protect America's reputation for toughness, and therefore its credibility, abroad; others countered that concerns regarding reputation were overblown, and that reputations are irrelevant for coercive diplomacy. Whether international reputations matter is the question at the heart of Fighting for Credibility. For skeptics, past actions and reputations have no bearing on an adversary's assessment of credibility; power and interests alone determine whether a threat is believed. Using a nuanced and sophisticated theory of rational deterrence, Frank P. Harvey and John Mitton argue the opposite: ignoring reputations sidesteps important factors about how adversaries perceive threats. Focusing on cases of asymmetric US encounters with smaller powers since the end of the Cold War including Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Syria, Harvey and Mitton reveal that reputations matter for credibility in international politics. This dynamic and deeply documented study successfully brings reputation back to the table of foreign diplomacy."-- Provided by publisher.
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Includes bibliographical references and index.

"When Bashar al-Assad used chemical weapons against his own people in Syria, he clearly crossed President Barack Obama's "red line." At the time, many argued that the president had to bomb in order to protect America's reputation for toughness, and therefore its credibility, abroad; others countered that concerns regarding reputation were overblown, and that reputations are irrelevant for coercive diplomacy. Whether international reputations matter is the question at the heart of Fighting for Credibility. For skeptics, past actions and reputations have no bearing on an adversary's assessment of credibility; power and interests alone determine whether a threat is believed. Using a nuanced and sophisticated theory of rational deterrence, Frank P. Harvey and John Mitton argue the opposite: ignoring reputations sidesteps important factors about how adversaries perceive threats. Focusing on cases of asymmetric US encounters with smaller powers since the end of the Cold War including Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Syria, Harvey and Mitton reveal that reputations matter for credibility in international politics. This dynamic and deeply documented study successfully brings reputation back to the table of foreign diplomacy."-- Provided by publisher.

Online resource; title from PDF title page (EBSCO, viewed February 1, 2017).

Cover; Contents; Acknowledgments; Introduction ; Chemical Weapons in Syria, 2012-13 ; Credibility and International Politics: The Case for Reputations; Credibility and International Politics: The Case against Reputations; Coercive Outcome in Syria ; Syria as a Deterrence/Compellence "Success"? ; Postscript ; Outline and Objectives.

1 Reputations Research and Premature Closure of Inquiry The Press-Mercer-Hopf Consensus ; 1.1 Hopf (1994) "Peripheral Visions" ; 1.2 Press (2005) "Calculating Credibility" ; 1.3 Mercer (1996) "Reputation and International Politics" ; Premature Closure of Inquiry: An Illustration.

1.4 Application of P-M-H Consensus Excludes Important Research on International ReputationsThe Missing Scholarship ; Conclusion ; 2 Reputations Matter: Rational Deterrence Theory and Credibility Reconsidered; 2.1 Four Core Prerequisites of Credible Coercive Threats ; RDT and Necessity and Sufficiency; Reassessing Fearon ; 2.2 Reputations and Imperfect Information.

2.3 Similarity and Transferability of Reputations and Credibility2.4 Reputations and Miscalculations ; 2.5 General versus Specific Reputations; 2.6 Reputations, Credibility, and Transferability Are in the Eyes of the Beholder; Conclusion ; 3 US Reputation Building in Deterrence Encounters, 1991-2003 ; Case 1 -- Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-5) ; Case 2 -- Kosovo (1998-9).

Case 3 -- Iraq (1991-2003) Conclusion ; 4 The Strategic Logic of US Coercion: Explaining Deterrence Failures and Successes in Syria, 2011-13; 4.1 Defining Success in Syria; 4.2 Syria: RDT versus P-M-H ; US Reputations and Past Actions ; Escalation and Mission Creep ; 4.3 Protracted Crises, Probes, and Tipping Points ; Assad's Miscalculations.

4.4 Credibility Paradox -- Punishments and Promises.

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