Foreign and domestic investment in Argentina : the politics of privatized infrastructure / Alison E. Post, University of California, Berkeley.

This book argues that for infrastructure privatization programs, differences in firm organizational structure explain the viability of privatization contracts in weak institutional environments.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Print version record.

Cover; Half-title page; Title page; Copyright page; Contents; Figures and Tables; Figures; Tables; Abbreviations; Acknowledgments; Introduction; Informal Supports for Long-Term Contracts: Domestic Investors' Home Court Advantage; Additional Contributions; Research Design; A Sector Focus on Urban Water and Sanitation; Nested, Subnational Comparisons; Sources; Road Map; 1 Informal Contractual Supports in Weak Institutional Environments; The Outcomes of Interest: Resilient versus Brittle Contractual Relationships; Bilateral Bargaining in a Volatile Political Setting.

Explaining Divergent Contractual RelationshipsInvestor Organizational Structure and Divergent Contract Trajectories; Firm Structure, Preferences, and Negotiating Tactics; Investor Organizational Structure and Embeddedness; Investor Organizational Structure and Predicted Contract Trajectories; Variation among Foreign Investors; Political Sources of Variation; Financial Resources and Changing Leverage over Time; Scope Conditions for the Argument; Alternative Explanations; Conclusion; 2 Water and Sanitation Privatization in Argentina: An Overview.

The Setting for Privatization: A Decentralized and Deficit-Ridden SystemA Relatively Uniform Privatization Program with Partial Uptake; The "Selection Process": Investor Entry into Particular Contracts; A Broad-Brush Test of the Book's Argument in the Argentine Water Sector; Choice and Measurement of the Key Dependent and Independent Variables; Conceptualizing and Measuring Investor Organizational Structure; Conceptualizing and Measuring Investor Exit; Measuring Successfully Concluded Contract Renegotiations; Conceptualizing and Measuring Post-Crisis Rate Increases.

Correlations between Investor Organizational Structure and Contractual OutcomesAn Initial Consideration of Alternative Explanations; Conclusion; 3 Contractual Fragility Prior to the Crisis: Investors without Diverse Local Holdings Falter; Identifying More and Less Challenging Political Environments for Infrastructure Contracts; Expectations and Measurement for Contracts in High-Hurdle Political Environments during Periods of High Investor Leverage; Foreign-Led Contracts in Provinces with High Political Hurdles; Saur's Faltering Trajectory in Mendoza Province.

The Implosion of Azurix's Contract in Buenos Aires ProvinceThe Collapse of the Aguas del Aconquija Contract in Tucumán; Domestic Investors with and without Local Holdings in High-Hurdle Environments: The Corrientes Case; Conclusion; Chapter Appendix; Political Hurdle Index; Details; 4 Smoother Sailing for All Investors in Less Competitive Provinces; Foreign-Led Contracts in Provinces with Low to Moderate Political Hurdles; Foreign Investor Suez's Portfolio in Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, and Córdoba; A Smooth Start for the Foreign-Held Contract in Misiones Province.

English.

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