TY - BOOK AU - Jacobs,Alan M. TI - Governing for the long term: democracy and the politics of investment SN - 9781139077651 AV - HN28 .J29 2011eb U1 - 331.25/2 22 PY - 2011/// CY - Cambridge, New York PB - Cambridge University Press KW - Social policy KW - Social choice KW - Political planning KW - Welfare economics KW - Externalities (Economics) KW - Political aspects KW - Pensions KW - Government policy KW - Case studies KW - Politique sociale KW - Choix collectif KW - Politique publique KW - Économie du bien-être KW - Économies externes KW - Aspect politique KW - Politique gouvernementale KW - Études de cas KW - public policy KW - aat KW - BUSINESS & ECONOMICS KW - Personal Finance KW - Retirement Planning KW - bisacsh KW - fast KW - Electronic books N1 - Includes bibliographical references (pages 269-293) and index; Part I. Problem and Theory: 1. The politics of when; 2. Theorizing intertemporal policy choice -- Part II. Programmatic Origins: Intertemporal Choice in Pension Design: 3. Investing in the state: the origins of German pensions, 1889; 4. The politics of mistrust: the origins of British pensions, 1925; 5. Investments as political constraint: the origins of U.S. pensions, 1935; 6. Investing for the short term: the origins of Canadian pensions, 1965 -- Part III. Programmatic Change: Intertemporal Choice in Pension Reform: 7. Investment as last resort: reforming U.S. pensions, 1977 and 1983; 8. Shifting the long-run burden: reforming British pensions, 1986; 9. Committing to investment: reforming Canadian pensions, 1998; 10. Constrained by uncertainty: reforming German pensions, 1989 and 2001 -- Part IV. Conclusion: 11. Understanding the politics of the long term N2 - "This book examines how democratic governments manage long-term policy challenges, asking how elected politicians choose between providing policy benefits in the present and investing in the future"--; "In Governing for the Long Term, Alan M. Jacobs investigates the conditions under which elected governments invest in long-term social benefits at short-term social cost. Jacobs contends that, along the path to adoption, investment-oriented policies must surmount three distinct hurdles to future-oriented state action: a problem of electoral risk, rooted in the scarcity of voter attention; a problem of prediction, deriving from the complexity of long-term policy effects; and a problem of institutional capacity, arising from interest groups' preferences for distributive gains over intertemporal bargains. Testing this argument through a four-country historical analysis of pension policymaking, the book illuminates crucial differences between the causal logics of distributive and intertemporal politics and makes a case for bringing trade-offs over time to the center of the study of policymaking"-- UR - https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=366258 ER -