TY  - BOOK
AU  - Craig,Campbell
AU  - Radchenko,Sergey
TI  - The atomic bomb and the origins of the Cold War
SN  - 9780300142655
AV  - D843 .C67 2008eb
U1  - 909.82/5 22
PY  - 2008///
CY  - New Haven
PB  - Yale University Press
KW  - Cold War
KW  - Atomic bomb
KW  - Political aspects
KW  - Guerre froide
KW  - Bombe atomique
KW  - Aspect politique
KW  - HISTORY
KW  - Modern
KW  - bisacsh
KW  - 20th Century
KW  - fast
KW  - Diplomatic relations
KW  - Kernwaffe
KW  - gnd
KW  - Außenpolitik
KW  - Ost-West-Konflikt
KW  - Kernwapens
KW  - gtt
KW  - Koude Oorlog
KW  - Ontstaansgeschiedenis
KW  - United States
KW  - Foreign relations
KW  - Soviet Union
KW  - 1945-1953
KW  - 1945-1991
KW  - États-Unis
KW  - Relations extérieures
KW  - URSS
KW  - Sowjetunion
KW  - USA
KW  - Verenigde Staten
KW  - Sovjet-Unie
KW  - Electronic books
KW  - Computer network resources
N1  - Includes bibliographical references (pages 171-195) and index; Franklin Delano Roosevelt and atomic wartime diplomacy -- The great game -- Truman, the bomb, and the end of World War II -- Responding to Hiroshima and Nagasaki -- The Baruch Plan and the onset of American Cold War -- Stalin and the burial of international control
N2  - After a devastating world war, culminating in the obliteration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it was clear that the United States and the Soviet Union had to establish a cooperative order if the planet was to escape an atomic World War III. In this provocative study, Campbell Craig and Sergey Radchenko show how the atomic bomb pushed the United States and the Soviet Union not toward cooperation but toward deep biploar confrontation. Joseph Stalin, sure that the Americans meant to deploy their new weapon against Russia and defeat socialism, would stop at nothing to build his own bomb. Harry Truman, initially willing to consider cooperation, discovered that its pursuit would mean political suicide, especially when news of Soviet atomic spies reached the public. Both superpowers, moreover, discerned a new reality of the new atomic age: now, cooperation must be total. The dangers posed by the bomb meant that intermediate measures of international cooperation would protect no one. Yet no two nations in history were less prepared to pursue total cooperation than were the United States and the Soviet Union. The logic of the bomb pointed them toward immediate Cold War
UR  - https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=278370
ER  -