TY - BOOK AU - Gasser,Georg AU - Stefan,Matthias TI - Personal identity: complex or simple? SN - 9781139840071 AV - BF697 .P468 2012eb U1 - 126 23 PY - 2012/// CY - Cambridge [England], New York PB - Cambridge University Press KW - Identity (Psychology) KW - Identité (Psychologie) KW - PHILOSOPHY KW - Mind & Body KW - bisacsh KW - PSYCHOLOGY KW - Personality KW - fast KW - Identität KW - gnd KW - Persönlichkeitstheorie KW - Jaget KW - sao KW - Identitet (psykologi) KW - Electronic books N1 - Includes bibliographical references and index; PERSONAL IDENTITY --; Title --; Illustrations --; Contributors --; Introduction --; THE PROJECT --; THE QUESTION OF PERSONAL IDENTITY --; THE DEBATE ABOUT PERSONAL IDENTITY --; THE BIOLOGICAL APPROACH --; THE PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH --; TWO PROBLEMS FOR COMPLEX APPROACHES --; FOUR-DIMENSIONALISM --; THE SIMPLE VIEW --; CONCLUSION --; PART I; : Framing the question --; 1; Chitchat on personal identity --; 2; In search of the simple view --; SIMPLE AND COMPLEX VIEWS --; PRELIMINARIES --; GROUNDING AND CRITERIA --; ANTI-CRITERIALISM --; ANALYZABILITY --; ADVOCATES OF ANALYTIC CRITERIALISM; EMPIRICIST THEORIESBRUTENESS --; NOONAN'S PROPOSAL --; SPECIFIC AND UNSPECIFIC --; EXPLANATORY DEMANDS --; 3; Personal identity, indeterminacy and obligation --; PERSONAL IDENTITY AND INDETERMINACY --; INDETERMINACY AND OBLIGATION --; INDETERMINACY AND MORAL DILEMMAS --; OBJECTIONS TO EPISTEMICISM --; INDETERMINACY AND SUBJECTIVISM --; 4; Personal identity and its perplexities --; INTRODUCTION --; THE PROBLEM OF PERSONAL IDENTITY --; THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE SIMPLE AND THE COMPLEX VIEW OF DIACHRONIC PERSONAL IDENTITY --; THE INDEXICALITY OF THE CONCEPT OF A PERSON --; THE COMPLEX VIEW AND INDETERMINACY; PART II; : Arguments for and against simplicity --; 5; : How to determine which is the true --; THE PROBLEM --; LOGICAL POSSIBILITY --; A POSTERIORI METAPHYSICAL POSSIBILITY --; THE HUMAN SOUL --; 6; Against simplicity --; I --; II --; III --; IV --; V --; 7; The probable simplicity of personal identity --; WHY SHOULD WE SEEK A CRITERION OF PERSONAL IDENTITY --; IDENTITY FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW --; WHAT IS A PERSON --; LOCKE'S CRITERION OF PERSONAL IDENTITY --; THE FATAL CIRCULARITY IN ANY NEO-LOCKEAN CRITERION --; REPLY TO AN OBJECTION --; 8; Reply to E.J. Lowe; 9; The non-descriptive individual nature of conscious beingsINTRODUCTION --; THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS AND METAPHYSICAL BASES OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S EXISTENCE --; NON-DESCRIPTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR AN INDIVIDUAL'S EXISTENCE --; THE INDIVIDUAL NATURE OF A STONE --; PERFECT COUNTERPARTS OF CONSCIOUS INDIVIDUALS --; THE CENTRAL CONCEPTUAL DISANALOGY --; CLARIFICATIONS OF THE CONCEPTUAL DISANALOGY CLAIM --; THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF THE EXISTENCE OF CONSCIOUS INDIVIDUALS --; IMPLICIT CONCEPTS AND PHILOSOPHICAL INSIGHTS --; ACCESS TO THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUS BEINGS ON THE BASIS OF BEING A CONSCIOUS BEING; PART III; : Reconsidering simplicity --; 10; : Personal identity: a not-so-simple simple view --; WHAT IS A SIMPLE VIEW OF PERSONAL IDENTITY --; A FIRST-PERSONAL APPROACH --; WHY NOT-SO-SIMPLE --; DO PERSONS HAVE PARTS --; WHY THERE ARE NO INFORMATIVE CRITERIA OF PERSONAL IDENTITY --; OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES --; CONCLUSION --; 11; Is "person" a sortal term --; INTRODUCTORY REMARKS --; "PERSON" IS A SORTAL TERM --; THE DON'T CARE VIEW --; "PERSON" IS A SEMANTICALLY UNIQUE TERM --; THE KIND OF PERSONS --; THE INDIVIDUAL FORM OF PERSONS --; THE UNITY-OF-CONSCIOUSNESS ARGUMENT; 12; Materialism, dualism, and "simple" theories of personal identity N2 - This book addresses whether personal identity is analyzable, with innovative discussion of 'complex' and 'simple' theories UR - https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=498382 ER -