TY  - BOOK
AU  - Annen,Kurt
AU  - Moers,Luc
ED  - International Monetary Fund.
TI  - Donor competition for aid impact, and aid fragmentation
T2  - IMF working paper
SN  - 1475559577
AV  - HG3881.5.I58 W67 No. 12/204eb
U1  - 339.22 23
PY  - 2012///
CY  - [Washington, D.C.]
PB  - International Monetary Fund
KW  - Economic assistance
KW  - Aide économique
KW  - assistance
KW  - aat
KW  - BUSINESS & ECONOMICS
KW  - Economics
KW  - Macroeconomics
KW  - bisacsh
KW  - POLITICAL SCIENCE
KW  - Economic Conditions
KW  - fast
KW  - Electronic books
KW  - gtlm
N1  - Title from PDF title page (IMF Web site, viewed Aug. 13, 2012); "Middle East and Central Asia Dept."; "August 2012."; Includes bibliographical references; Cover; Contents; 1 Introduction; 2 Donor Coordination in Practice: Fragmentation; Figures; 1 Number of Recipient Countries and Global Aid Budget Shares; 2 Global Aid Herfindahl Index; 3 Background Literature; 4 Model; 4.1 Donors Maximize Net Aid Impact; 4.2 Donors Maximize Relative Net Aid Impact; 3 Best-Response Functions with Identical Donors; 4.3 Introducing Fixed Costs; 4 Best-Response Functions with Non-Identical Donors; 4.4 Introducing More Recipients and More Donors; 5 Empirical Evidence; Tables; 1 Larger Donors vs. Smaller Donors; 5 Herfindahl Index and Relative Donor Size; 2 Donor Ranking in Aid Selectivity3 Donor Selectivity and Herfindahl Index; 6 Conclusion; References; Appendix A; Proof of Proposition 1; Description of Best-Response Functions; Proof of Proposition 4; Appendix B; Table 4: Donor Selectivity and MLD; Table 5: Donor Selectivity and Theil Index
N2  - This paper shows that donors that maximize relative aid impact spread their budgets across many recipient countries in a unique Nash equilibrium, explaining aid fragmentation. This equilibrium may be inefficient even without fixed costs, and the inefficiency increases in the equality of donors' budgets. The paper presents empirical evidence consistent with theoretical results. These imply that, short of ending donors' maximization of relative aid impact, agreements to better coordinate aid allocations are not implementable. Moreover, since policies to increase donor competition in terms of aid effectiveness risk reinforcing relativeness, they may well backfire, as any such reinforcement increases aid fragmentation
UR  - https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=568141
ER  -