The Political Economy of Sovereign Default

By:

Sebastian Hohmann [auth]

Material type: Article

ArticleLanguage: English Publication details: Graduate Institute Publications 2012ISBN:

9782940503070
9782940503087

Subject(s):

Online resources:

Summary: What do self-interested governments' needs to maintain loyal groups of supporters imply for sovereign incentives to repay debt? Many sovereign defaults have occurred at relatively low levels of debt, while some highly indebted nations continue to honour their obligations. This poses a problem for traditional models of sovereign debt, which rely on the threat of economic sanctions to explain why and when a representative agent seeking to maximise social welfare would choose debt-repayment. The...

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What do self-interested governments' needs to maintain loyal groups of supporters imply for sovereign incentives to repay debt? Many sovereign defaults have occurred at relatively low levels of debt, while some highly indebted nations continue to honour their obligations. This poses a problem for traditional models of sovereign debt, which rely on the threat of economic sanctions to explain why and when a representative agent seeking to maximise social welfare would choose debt-repayment. The...

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