Securities Fraud, 1996-2001 : Incentive Pay, Governance, and Class Action Lawsuits.

By:

Wang, Ke, 1972 November 6-

Material type: Text

TextSeries: Criminal justice (LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC)Publication details: El Paso : LFB Scholarly Pub. LLC, 2010.Description: 1 online resource (180 pages)Content type:

text

Media type:

computer

Carrier type:

online resource

ISBN:

9781593325640
1593325649

Subject(s):

Genre/Form:

Additional physical formats: Print version:: No titleDDC classification:

364.163

LOC classification:

HV6768 .W368 2010

Online resources:

Click here to access online

Contents:

Defining securities fraud -- Theorizing securities fraud: a complex and inadequately researched phenomenon -- Explaining securities fraud: an integrated conceptual model -- Finding the deviant corporations: research methods and data -- Incentive compensation: a source of securities fraud -- Corporate governance : a fraud-preventing process depending on context -- Controlling securities fraud : policy implications.

Summary: Wang seeks to explain why one company committed securities fraud only during certain years and why some companies had a higher propensity to commit securities fraud. He finds evidence linking executive incentive compensation to securities fraud. Some corporate governance measures may also play a role in fraud control. Findings vary, however, depending on the stages of judicial proceedings at which securities fraud class action cases are examined. Researchers and practitioners from fields other than criminal justice, such as law and economics, management, and accounting, may find this work usef.

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Wang seeks to explain why one company committed securities fraud only during certain years and why some companies had a higher propensity to commit securities fraud. He finds evidence linking executive incentive compensation to securities fraud. Some corporate governance measures may also play a role in fraud control. Findings vary, however, depending on the stages of judicial proceedings at which securities fraud class action cases are examined. Researchers and practitioners from fields other than criminal justice, such as law and economics, management, and accounting, may find this work usef.