Making constitutions in deeply divided societies / Hanna Lerner.

Print version record.

Cover; MAKING CONSTITUTIONS IN DEEPLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES; CONTENTS; ACKNOWLEDGMENTS; Introduction; Title; Copyright; PART I Constitutions, democracy, identity; 1 Three paradigms of democratic constitutions; What is a constitution and what are its roles?; "The people" precede the constitution: the essentialist "nation-state" constitution; "The people" come together through the making of the constitution: the liberal-procedural constitution; Pre-constitutional consensus; 2 The incrementalist approach to constitution-making; Deeply divided societies; Constitution-drafting as a high-stakes moment.

Institutional design in multi-ethnic and multinational societiesThe incrementalist approach to constitution-making; Non-majoritarianism; Non-revolutionary approach to constitution-making; We the divided people: representing the existing disagreements; Transferring decisions to the political sphere; PART II Varieties of constitutional incrementalism; 3 Informal consociationalism in Israel; Refraining from drafting a constitution in the formative stage; "What is the State of Israel?"; The Knesset debates: February-June 1950; Constitution-making as resolving or exacerbating conflicts.

Constitutional decision-makingEvolution or revolution; Informal consociationalism in the religious sphere; Escalation of the religious-secular conflict; The "constitutional revolution"; The counterrevolution; Consociationalism versus constitutionalism; Perpetual incrementalism; Constitutional incrementalism and the Arab minority in Israel; 4 Constructive ambiguity in India; A proposal for regional federalism: the Cabinet Mission plan; Rival paradigms of Indian nationalism; The failure of the May 16 plan; Formalization of the conflict; The Constituent Assembly after partition.

"Unity amidst diversity"Uniform civil code; National language; Constructive ambiguity; 5 Symbolic ambivalence in Ireland; The treaty debates; Conflicting visions of independent Ireland; Collins' goal of consensus; Deeply divided committee; The politicization of the constitution; London: imposed amendments; Debating the constitution; Symbolic ambivalence; 1937-98: the return of constitutional incrementalism; PART III Arguments for and against constitutional incrementalism; 6 Normative arguments for constitutional incrementalism; Arguing for consensual decision-making.

Evolutionary process versus revolutionary moment of constitution-makingEmbracing competing visions; Preparing the ground for future political decisions; 7 Potential dangers; Compromising basic rights; Over-rigidity of a material constitution; Increasing tensions between legislature and judiciary; Israel: constitutional impasse; India: the debate over a uniform civil code continues; Principles versus practical necessity; Conclusion; BIBLIOGRAPHY; INDEX.

An exploration of how a constitution may be drafted in societies which lack entrenched common values.

Includes bibliographical references (pages 235-257) and index.

English.

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