Borrowing constitutional designs : constitutional law in Weimar, Germany and the French Fifth Republic / Cindy Skach.
Material type: TextPublication details: Princeton, N.J. ; Oxford : Princeton University Press, ©2005.Description: 1 online resource (xiii, 151 pages) : illustrationsContent type:- text
- computer
- online resource
- 9781400832620
- 1400832624
- 0691146721
- 9780691146720
- 9786613001269
- 6613001260
- 1283001268
- 9781283001267
- Verfassung <1958>
- Verfassung <1919>
- Executive power
- Democracy
- Constitutional history
- Democracy -- Germany -- History
- Democracy -- France -- History
- Pouvoir exécutif
- Démocratie
- Histoire constitutionnelle
- Démocratie -- Allemagne -- Histoire
- Démocratie -- France -- Histoire
- democracy
- POLITICAL SCIENCE -- Political Process -- General
- HISTORY -- Europe -- General
- Constitutional history
- Democracy
- Executive power
- France
- Germany
- Verfassungsrecht
- Staatsorganisationsrecht
- Rechtsvergleich
- Frankreich
- Deutschland
- 320.943/09/042 22
- JF251 .S53 2005eb
Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Materials specified | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Electronic-Books | OPJGU Sonepat- Campus | E-Books EBSCO | Available |
Constitutional frameworks and constitutional law -- Parties, leaders, and constitutional law in Ebert's Republic -- Divided minorities and constitutional dictatorship in Weimar Germany -- Parties, leaders, and constitutional law in de Gaulle's republic -- Consolidated majorities and constitutional democracy in the French Fifth Republic.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 129-144) and index.
"Bringing constitutional frameworks back to the study of constitutional law, Borrowing Constitutional Designs questions the hasty adoption of semi-presidentialism by new democracies. Drawing on rich case studies of two of the most important countries for European politics in the twentieth century - Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic - Cindy Skach offers the first theoretically focused, and historically grounded, analysis of semi-presidentialism and democracy. She demonstrates that constitutional choice matters, because under certain conditions, semi-presidentialism structures incentives that make democratic consolidation difficult or that actually contribute to democratic collapse. She offers a new theory of constitutional design, integrating insights from law and the social sciences. In doing so, she challenges both democratic theory and democratic practice." "This book will be welcomed not only by scholars and practitioners of constitutional law but also by those in fields such as comparative politics, European politics and history, and international and public affairs."--Jacket.
Print version record.
English.
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