Greasing the wheels : using pork barrel projects to build majority coalitions in Congress / Diana Evans.
Material type: TextPublication details: Cambridge ; New York, N.Y. : Cambridge University Press, 2004.Description: 1 online resource (xii, 267 pages)Content type:- text
- computer
- online resource
- 9780511211911
- 0511211910
- 9780521836814
- 0521836816
- 9780521545327
- 0521545323
- 0511215495
- 9780511215490
- 0511217285
- 9780511217289
- 9780511617140
- 0511617143
- 1280540559
- 9781280540554
- 9786610540556
- 6610540551
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- 0511213689
- 9780511213687
- United States. Congress -- Voting
- United States. Congress -- Appropriations and expenditures
- Etats-Unis. Congress -- Credits budgetaires et depenses
- Etats-Unis. Congress -- Vote
- United States. Congress
- USA Congress
- Coalitions
- United States -- Politics and government
- Coalitions
- États-Unis -- Politique et gouvernement
- POLITICAL SCIENCE -- Government -- Legislative Branch
- Coalitions
- Expenditures, Public
- Politics and government
- Voting registers
- United States
- Koalitionsbildung
- Wahlsystem
- 328.73/0775 22
- JK1051 .E93 2004eb
Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Materials specified | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Electronic-Books | OPJGU Sonepat- Campus | E-Books EBSCO | Available |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 245-258) and index.
Print version record.
Pork barrel politics and general interest legislation -- Who calls the shots? The allocation of pork barrel projects -- Highway demonstration projects and voting on the federal highway program -- Presidential bargaining with congress: the NAFTA bazaar -- Pork barreling in the Senate: do both parties do it?
Pork barrel projects would surely rank near the top of most observers' lists of Congress's most widely despised products. Yet, political leaders in Congress and the President often trade pork for votes to pass legislation that serves broad national purposes, giving members of Congress pork barrel projects in return for their votes on general interest legislation. It is a practice that succeeds at a cost, but it is a cost that many political leaders are willing to pay in order to enact the broader public policies that they favor. There is an irony in this: pork barrel benefits, the most reviled of Congress's legislative products, are used by policy coalition leaders to produce the type of policy that is most admired - general interest legislation. This book makes the case that buying votes with pork is one way in which Congress solves its well-known collective action problem.
English.
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