Aristotle's De anima / Ronald Polansky.

Includes bibliographical references (pages 555-562) and index.

Cover -- Dedication -- Contents -- Preface -- Abbreviations -- Introduction -- 1 The De anima and Self-Knowledge -- 2 Study of Soul in Relation to Physics -- 3 The Cognitive Faculties and Physics -- 4 Aristotles Procedures and the Quest for Thoroughness -- 5 Background Assumptions for Study of the Soul -- 6 The Truth and Interest of the De anima -- 7 The Text of the De anima -- COMMENTARY ON DE ANIMA Book 1 -- 113;The Nobility and Difficulty of Study of Soul; Its13;Connection with Body -- 2 The Predecessors Use of Soul to Account for Motion and Perception -- 313;Criticism of Predecessors Way of Accounting13;for Motion -- 4 Criticism of the Harmonia View as an Account of Motion -- 513;Criticism of Predecessors Way of Accounting13;for Cognition -- Book 2 -- 1 Definition of Soul -- 2 What Is Life? -- 313;How Powers of Soul Are Distributed and13;United in the Soul -- 413;The Nutritive Faculty:13;Its Object and Subfaculties -- 513;Clarification of Being Affected, Living as Saving,13;and the First Definition of Sense -- 6 The Three Sorts of Sensible Objects -- 7 Vision, Medium, and Object -- 8 Hearing, Sound, and Voice -- 9 Smell and Odor -- 1013;Taste Is a Contact Sense; the Tasteable -- 11 Touch, the Tangibles, and Sense as a Mean -- 1213;Definition of Sense and Whether Sensibles Affect13;Nonperceiving Bodies -- Book 3 -- 113;In the World As It Is There Can Be but the Five Senses -- 2 What Allows for Perceiving That We Perceive; Sense Joins in a Common Power so That the Five Senses Are Subfaculties of a Central Sense Faculty -- 313;Distinguishing Sense and Thought; What Is Phantasia? -- 413;What Is Mind as That Capable of Thinking All Things -- 5 What Enables Thinking to Occur -- 6 The Sorts of Intelligible Objects -- 7 Phantasia Has a Role in All Thinking -- 8 That Mind Can Think All Things -- 913;There Is a Capacity for Progressive Motion -- 1013;The Desiderative Capacity Is the Primary Cause13;of Progressive Motion -- 1113;Even the Simplest Animals Have Indefinite Phantasia,13;and Calculative Phantasia Fits the Account13;of Progressive Motion -- 1213;The Necessary Order of the Faculties of Soul -- 1313;The Sort of Body Requisite to Support the Order13;of the Faculties of Soul -- Bibliography -- Index.

Aristotle's De anima is the first systematic philosophical account of the soul, which serves to explain the functioning of all mortal living things. In his commentary, Ronald Polansky argues that the work is far more structured and systematic than previou.

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