Weak courts, strong rights : judicial review and social welfare rights in comparative constitutional law / Mark Tushnet.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Why comparative constitutional law? -- Alternative forms of judicial review -- The possible instability of weak-form review and its implications -- Why and how to evaluate consitutional performance -- Constitutional decision making outside the courts -- The state action doctrine and social and economic rights -- Structures of judicial review, horizontal effect, and social welfare rights -- Enforcing social and economic rights.

Unlike many other countries, the United States has few constitutional guarantees of social welfare rights such as income, housing, or healthcare. In part this is because many Americans believe that the courts cannot possibly enforce such guarantees. However, recent innovations in constitutional design in other countries suggest that such rights can be judicially enforced--not by increasing the power of the courts but by decreasing it. In Weak Courts, Strong Rights, Mark Tushnet uses a comparative legal perspective to show how creating weaker forms of judicial review may actually allow for stro.

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