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The limits of Leviathan : contract theory and the enforcement of International Law / Robert E. Scott, Paul B. Stephan.

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextPublication details: Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, ©2006.Description: 1 online resource (viii, 255 pages)Content type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 0511249977
  • 9780511249976
  • 9780511250484
  • 0511250487
  • 0511247834
  • 9780511247835
  • 0511251319
  • 9780511251313
  • 9780511511370
  • 051151137X
  • 9780521858465
  • 0521858461
  • 9780521367974
  • 0521367972
Subject(s): Genre/Form: Additional physical formats: Print version:: Limits of Leviathan.DDC classification:
  • 341 22
LOC classification:
  • K2330 .S36 2006eb
Other classification:
  • KC86
Online resources:
Contents:
States, firms and the enforcement of international law -- Lessons from contract theory -- A model of optimal enforcement -- Patterns of international law enforcement -- The choice between formal and informal enforcement -- The future of international law enforcement.
Review: "Much of international law, like much of contract, is enforced not by independent sanctions but rather through cooperative interaction among the parties, with repeat dealings, reputation, and a preference for reciprocity doing most of the enforcement work. The Limits of Leviathan identifies the areas in international law where formal enforcement provides the most promising means of promoting cooperation and where it does not. In particular, it looks at the International Criminal Court, the rules for world trade, efforts to enlist domestic courts to enforce orders of the International Court of Justice, domestic judicial enforcement of the Geneva Convention, the domain of international commercial agreements, and the question of odious debt incurred by sovereigns. This book explains how international law, like contract, depends largely on the willingness of responsible parties to make commitments."--Jacket.
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Electronic-Books Electronic-Books OPJGU Sonepat- Campus E-Books EBSCO Available

Includes bibliographical references (pages 225-245) and index.

States, firms and the enforcement of international law -- Lessons from contract theory -- A model of optimal enforcement -- Patterns of international law enforcement -- The choice between formal and informal enforcement -- The future of international law enforcement.

"Much of international law, like much of contract, is enforced not by independent sanctions but rather through cooperative interaction among the parties, with repeat dealings, reputation, and a preference for reciprocity doing most of the enforcement work. The Limits of Leviathan identifies the areas in international law where formal enforcement provides the most promising means of promoting cooperation and where it does not. In particular, it looks at the International Criminal Court, the rules for world trade, efforts to enlist domestic courts to enforce orders of the International Court of Justice, domestic judicial enforcement of the Geneva Convention, the domain of international commercial agreements, and the question of odious debt incurred by sovereigns. This book explains how international law, like contract, depends largely on the willingness of responsible parties to make commitments."--Jacket.

Print version record.

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