When leaders learn and when they don't : Mikhail Gorbachev and Kim Il Sung at the end of the Cold War / Akan Malici.

Includes bibliographical references (pages 167-188) and index.

The argument -- Political leadership and the puzzle of foreign policy change and continuity -- Mikhail Gorbachev and Kim Il Sung -- The decision-making approach -- Beliefs and strategic interaction -- Outline of the book -- A theory of foreign policy decisions -- The theory of moves (TOM) -- Preferences need inferences -- Making beliefs and learning patterns visible -- The theory of inferences about preferences (TIP) -- The subjective games of Gorbachev's predecessors (1980-1985) -- The cases -- Gorbachev: uncommitted thinker and motivated learner -- The early Gorbachev era (1985-1986) -- The second year of the Gorbachev era (February 1986-January 1987) -- Gorbachev: committed teacher and reformer -- Gorbachev induces U.S. cooperation (1987-1988) -- Gorbachev transforms great power politics (1989-1991) -- Kim Il Sung: revolutionary cold warrior -- Deadlock in the Cold War (1980-1983) -- The deadlock continues (1984-1986) -- Kim Il Sung: touched by the winds of change? -- The catalytic period (1987-1990) -- The post-Cold War period (1991-1994) -- The implications -- Lessons from the past and applications to the future -- Main findings -- Theoretical significance -- The continued relevance of Gorbachev and Kim Il Sung.

Print version record.

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