Essays in the metaphysics of modality / Alvin Plantinga ; edited by Matthew Davidson.

By:

Plantinga, Alvin

Contributor(s):

Material type: Text

TextPublication details: Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2003.Description: 1 online resource (vi, 239 pages)Content type:

text

Media type:

computer

Carrier type:

online resource

ISBN:

0195103769
9780195103762
0195103777
9780195103779
9780198026389
0198026382
1281930148
9781281930149

Subject(s): Genre/Form:

Additional physical formats: Essays in the metaphysics of modality.DDC classification:

110 22

LOC classification:

B945.P553 M48 2003b E-book

Online resources:

Click here to access online

Contents:

Contents -- Introduction: Matthew Davidson -- 1. De Re et De Dicto -- 2. World and Essence -- 3. Transworld Identity or Worldbound Individuals? -- 4. The Nature of Necessity, Chapter VIII -- 5. Actualism and Possible Worlds -- 6. The Boethian Compromise -- 7. De Essentia -- 8. On Existentialism -- 9. Reply to John L. Pollock -- 10. Two Concepts of Modality: Modal Realism and Modal Reductionism -- 11. Why Propositions Cannot Be Concrete -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R

ST -- U -- V -- W

Summary: This book is a collection of my essays, dating from 1969, concerning the metaphysics of modality. The first two chapters are a defense of the idea of modality de re against criticisms from William Kneale and W.V. Quine, and an elaboration on the notions of possible worlds and essences. In the third chapter, I conclude that the Theory of Worldbound Individuals is false, even when fortified with Counterpart Theory. Chapter 4 contains an argument for the conclusion that there neither are, nor could have been, possible but nonexistent objects. In the next chapter, I develop this theme in greater detail and argue for the compatibility of actualism -- i.e., the view that there neither are, nor could have been, any nonexistent objects --and possible worlds. Both Chs. 6 and 7 contain an account of the relationship between proper names and essences, my view being that proper names express essences and that sometimes different proper names for the same object express different essences of that object. The end of Ch. 7 and all of Ch. 8 are an examination of existentialism (the theory that propositions and states of affairs ontologically depend on their subjects) and arguments against it. In Ch. 9, I defend my theory of modality against objections raised by John Pollock. In Ch. 10, I sketch out what the commitments of modal realism are, and argue that David Lewis's modal theory is not a modal realist theory. Finally, in the concluding chapter I argue that propositions cannot be concrete objects.

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A collection of previously published articles from 1969 to 1993.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

This book is a collection of my essays, dating from 1969, concerning the metaphysics of modality. The first two chapters are a defense of the idea of modality de re against criticisms from William Kneale and W.V. Quine, and an elaboration on the notions of possible worlds and essences. In the third chapter, I conclude that the Theory of Worldbound Individuals is false, even when fortified with Counterpart Theory. Chapter 4 contains an argument for the conclusion that there neither are, nor could have been, possible but nonexistent objects. In the next chapter, I develop this theme in greater detail and argue for the compatibility of actualism -- i.e., the view that there neither are, nor could have been, any nonexistent objects --and possible worlds. Both Chs. 6 and 7 contain an account of the relationship between proper names and essences, my view being that proper names express essences and that sometimes different proper names for the same object express different essences of that object. The end of Ch. 7 and all of Ch. 8 are an examination of existentialism (the theory that propositions and states of affairs ontologically depend on their subjects) and arguments against it. In Ch. 9, I defend my theory of modality against objections raised by John Pollock. In Ch. 10, I sketch out what the commitments of modal realism are, and argue that David Lewis's modal theory is not a modal realist theory. Finally, in the concluding chapter I argue that propositions cannot be concrete objects.