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Rational herds : economic models of social learning / Christophe P. Chamley.

By: Material type: TextTextPublication details: Cambridge, UK ; New York : Cambridge University Press, ©2004.Description: 1 online resource (xiv, 402 pages) : illustrationsContent type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 0511165978
  • 9780511165979
  • 0511165382
  • 9780511165382
  • 9780511616372
  • 0511616376
  • 9780511164828
  • 0511164823
  • 1280437545
  • 9781280437540
  • 9786610437542
  • 6610437548
  • 1107146364
  • 9781107146365
  • 0511312865
  • 9780511312861
Other title:
  • Economic models of social learning
Subject(s): Genre/Form: Additional physical formats: Print version:: Rational herds.DDC classification:
  • 303.3/2 22
LOC classification:
  • HQ783 .C47 2004eb
Other classification:
  • 77.61
  • QH 300
Online resources:
Contents:
1. Introduction -- Part I. Social learning : 2. Bayesian tools : The bayesian framework ; Binary and Gaussian information ; Private signals and beliefs ; Martingales -- 3. Social learning with a common memory : A canonical model of social learning ; Efficient learning ; Observation noise ; Extensions -- 4. Cascades and herds : The basic model of herding ; The standard model with bounded beliefs ; The convergence of beliefs ; Herds and the slow convergence of beliefs ; Pricing the informational externality ; Crashes and booms -- 5. Limited memories : The sequential model with sampling ; The welfare-improving principle ; Sampling in a very large population ; Social learning or sampling in a large population? -- 6. Delays : The simplest model ; A general model with heterogeneous beliefs ; Properties -- 7. More delays : The length of a period ; Continuous times ; Buildup of private information ; Observation of payoffs -- 8. Outcomes : Incomplete learning ; The determinant of economic success: luck or effort? ; Complete learning with a diversity of private beliefs -- 9. Networks and diffusion : Optimization and diffusion of innovations ; Learning in networks -- 10. Words : Advice by one expert ; Larger sets of states and messages ; Panel of experts ; The receiver does not make the evaluation -- Part II. Coordination : 11. Guessing to coordinate : Overview ; Eductive stability in a standard market ; Strategic complementarities ; Speculative attacks against a fixed exchange rate -- 12. Learning to coordinate : A distribution with a cluster ; Observation noise -- 13. Delays and payoff externalities : Strategic substitutability ; Strategic complementaries -- Part III. Financial herding : 14.l Sequences of financial trades : Learning in the model of Glosten and Milgrom ; Herds ; Avalanches ; Herding in auctions -- 15. Gaussian financial markets : Actions in the CARA-Gauss model ; Markets ; The convergence of beliefs ; Multiple equilibria, crashes, and booms -- 16. Financial frenzies : Speculative attacks against a fixed exchange rate ; Information delays in financial markets ; The crash of a bubble.
Summary: This book is the first in the exciting new field of social learning.
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Includes bibliographical references (pages 385-394) and indexes.

Print version record.

1. Introduction -- Part I. Social learning : 2. Bayesian tools : The bayesian framework ; Binary and Gaussian information ; Private signals and beliefs ; Martingales -- 3. Social learning with a common memory : A canonical model of social learning ; Efficient learning ; Observation noise ; Extensions -- 4. Cascades and herds : The basic model of herding ; The standard model with bounded beliefs ; The convergence of beliefs ; Herds and the slow convergence of beliefs ; Pricing the informational externality ; Crashes and booms -- 5. Limited memories : The sequential model with sampling ; The welfare-improving principle ; Sampling in a very large population ; Social learning or sampling in a large population? -- 6. Delays : The simplest model ; A general model with heterogeneous beliefs ; Properties -- 7. More delays : The length of a period ; Continuous times ; Buildup of private information ; Observation of payoffs -- 8. Outcomes : Incomplete learning ; The determinant of economic success: luck or effort? ; Complete learning with a diversity of private beliefs -- 9. Networks and diffusion : Optimization and diffusion of innovations ; Learning in networks -- 10. Words : Advice by one expert ; Larger sets of states and messages ; Panel of experts ; The receiver does not make the evaluation -- Part II. Coordination : 11. Guessing to coordinate : Overview ; Eductive stability in a standard market ; Strategic complementarities ; Speculative attacks against a fixed exchange rate -- 12. Learning to coordinate : A distribution with a cluster ; Observation noise -- 13. Delays and payoff externalities : Strategic substitutability ; Strategic complementaries -- Part III. Financial herding : 14.l Sequences of financial trades : Learning in the model of Glosten and Milgrom ; Herds ; Avalanches ; Herding in auctions -- 15. Gaussian financial markets : Actions in the CARA-Gauss model ; Markets ; The convergence of beliefs ; Multiple equilibria, crashes, and booms -- 16. Financial frenzies : Speculative attacks against a fixed exchange rate ; Information delays in financial markets ; The crash of a bubble.

This book is the first in the exciting new field of social learning.

English.

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