Strategic foundations of general equilibrium : dynamic matching and bargaining games / Douglas Gale.
Material type:
TextSeries: Churchill lectures in economicsPublication details: Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2000.Description: 1 online resource (xi, 219 pages) : illustrationsContent type: - text
- computer
- online resource
- 0511011164
- 9780511011160
- 0511117442
- 9780511117442
- 9780511492310
- 0511492316
- 9780511051883
- 0511051883
- 0511152248
- 9780511152245
- 1280153768
- 9781280153761
- Competition
- Equilibrium (Economics)
- Game theory
- Game Theory
- Economic Competition
- Concurrence
- Équilibre (Économie politique)
- Théorie des jeux
- BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- Industries -- General
- Equilibrium (Economics)
- Game theory
- Competition
- Competition
- Equilibrium (Economics)
- Game theory
- Wettbewerbstheorie
- Spieltheorie
- Gleichgewichtstheorie
- Economisch evenwicht
- Concurrentie
- Speltheorie
- Équilibre (économie politique)
- Jeux, Théorie des
- 338.6/048/015193 21
- HD41 .G35 2000eb
- 83.03
- F019. 1
- F038. 2
- F224. 32
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Electronic-Books
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Includes bibliographical references (pages 208-213) and index.
Print version record.
Markets and games -- Strategic foundations of perfect competition -- Why strategic foundations? -- Cooperative market games -- Non-cooperative market games -- Dynamic matching and bargaining models -- Open questions -- Perfect competition -- Pure exchange economics -- Dynamic matching and bargaining games -- Equilibrium -- The Edgeworth Property -- Efficiency -- Competitive sequences of economies -- Existence -- Efficiency with discounting -- Random matching -- Mixed equilibria -- A summing up -- Continuity and anonymity -- Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990) -- Bounded rationality and uniqueness -- The Limit Principle -- Repeated games -- Limited memory -- Large anonymous games -- Non-anonymous games -- Bounded rationality -- Imitation and experimentation -- A behavioral model of competition -- Convergence to competitive prices -- Extensions.
"This book, written by contemporary economic theorists, reports on a major research program to provide strategic foundations for the theory of perfect competition."
"Beginning with a concise survey of how the theory of competition has evolved, Gale makes extensive and rigorous use of dynamic matching and bargaining models to provide a more complete description of how a competitive equilibrium is achieved. Whereas economists have made use of a macroscopic description of markets in which certain behavioral characteristics, such as price-talking behavior, are taken for granted, Gale uses games theory to re-evaluate this assumption, beginning with individual agents and modelling their strategic interaction. A strategic foundation for competitive equilibrium shows how such interaction leads to competitive, price-talking behavior."
"This book is essential reading for graduate courses in game theory and general equilibrium."--Jacket.
English.
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