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No solution : the Labour government and the Northern Ireland conflict, 1974-79 / S.C. Aveyard.

By: Material type: TextTextPublisher: Manchester : Manchester University Press, 2016Description: 1 online resourceContent type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9781526108272
  • 1526108275
  • 9781526108265
  • 1526108267
  • 9781526120854
  • 1526120852
Subject(s): Genre/Form: Additional physical formats: Print version:: No titleDDC classification:
  • 941.60824 23
LOC classification:
  • JN1129.L32
Online resources:
Contents:
Cover; Title page; Copyright page; Dedication; Contents; Figures and tables; Acknowledgements; Abbreviations; Introduction; Notes; 1 Background: British Labour and Northern Ireland, 1964-74; Internal reform; The escalation of violence; Direct rule and security; Sunningdale and Labour; Notes; 2 The collapse of power-sharing; Reactions to the election; Security policy; Contingency planning and withdrawal; The Ulster Workers' Council strike; Conclusion; Notes; 3 Drift?; Doomsday plans and the Convention; Security policy after Sunningdale; Birmingham; Ceasefire preparations; Conclusion; Notes.
4 Negotiating the Provisional IRA ceasefireResponding to the Provisionals; Dialogue with the Provisionals; The reaction of the security forces; Constitutional politics and the ceasefire; Labour's expectations; Conclusion; Notes; 5 Fraying at the edges: the Provisional IRA ceasefire; The dialogue; Sectarian violence and the Convention elections; The army and the RUC; Stuttering contact; Security legislation and the return to talks; The drift back to violence; The Convention and the ceasefire; The breakdown of the ceasefire; Conclusion; Notes; 6 After the ceasefire; The Convention.
Security policyThe resumption of conflict; Indefinite direct rule; Conclusion; Notes; 7 Police primacy and the myth of Ulsterisation; The Bourn proposals; Army frustration; Roy Mason and 'semi-detention'; Implementing the Bourn proposals; Ulsterisation; Westminster; The UUAC strike; Intensification; The Pritchard review; Conclusion; Notes; 8 'Positive direct rule': economic policy; The economy and the conflict; Assisting industry; The economic crisis in Britain; Developing a strategy; Mason's big push; Conclusion; Notes; 9 Political inertia; After the Convention; Administrative devolution.
Deals at WestminsterThe SDLP; Interim devolution; Jack Lynch; Northern Ireland representation; La Mon and the Republic of Ireland; 'Neutrality'; Conclusion; Notes; 10 The evolution of the long war; The Provisional IRA; Pressures for change; The SAS and 'shoot-to-kill'; The prisons; Police interrogation; The fall of the Labour government; Conclusion; Notes; Conclusion; Notes; Bibliography; Government archives; Private papers; Official publications; Newspapers and periodicals; Documentaries; Books, articles and theses; Index.
Summary: No solution demonstrates the naivety of claims that a solution to the Northern Ireland conflict could have been imposed by the British state two decades before the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. It also argues that while there is a tremendous volume of material written on the Northern Ireland conflict, areas remain where there is a poverty of understanding.
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Introduction 1 Background: British Labour and Northern Ireland 1964-74 2 The collapse of power-sharing 3 Drift? 4 Negotiating the Provisional IRA ceasefire 5 Fraying at the edges: the Provisional IRA ceasefire 6 After the ceasefire 7 Police primacy and the myth of Ulsterisation 8 'Positive direct rule': economic policy 9 Political inertia 10 The evolution of the long war Conclusion Index.

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Cover; Title page; Copyright page; Dedication; Contents; Figures and tables; Acknowledgements; Abbreviations; Introduction; Notes; 1 Background: British Labour and Northern Ireland, 1964-74; Internal reform; The escalation of violence; Direct rule and security; Sunningdale and Labour; Notes; 2 The collapse of power-sharing; Reactions to the election; Security policy; Contingency planning and withdrawal; The Ulster Workers' Council strike; Conclusion; Notes; 3 Drift?; Doomsday plans and the Convention; Security policy after Sunningdale; Birmingham; Ceasefire preparations; Conclusion; Notes.

4 Negotiating the Provisional IRA ceasefireResponding to the Provisionals; Dialogue with the Provisionals; The reaction of the security forces; Constitutional politics and the ceasefire; Labour's expectations; Conclusion; Notes; 5 Fraying at the edges: the Provisional IRA ceasefire; The dialogue; Sectarian violence and the Convention elections; The army and the RUC; Stuttering contact; Security legislation and the return to talks; The drift back to violence; The Convention and the ceasefire; The breakdown of the ceasefire; Conclusion; Notes; 6 After the ceasefire; The Convention.

Security policyThe resumption of conflict; Indefinite direct rule; Conclusion; Notes; 7 Police primacy and the myth of Ulsterisation; The Bourn proposals; Army frustration; Roy Mason and 'semi-detention'; Implementing the Bourn proposals; Ulsterisation; Westminster; The UUAC strike; Intensification; The Pritchard review; Conclusion; Notes; 8 'Positive direct rule': economic policy; The economy and the conflict; Assisting industry; The economic crisis in Britain; Developing a strategy; Mason's big push; Conclusion; Notes; 9 Political inertia; After the Convention; Administrative devolution.

Deals at WestminsterThe SDLP; Interim devolution; Jack Lynch; Northern Ireland representation; La Mon and the Republic of Ireland; 'Neutrality'; Conclusion; Notes; 10 The evolution of the long war; The Provisional IRA; Pressures for change; The SAS and 'shoot-to-kill'; The prisons; Police interrogation; The fall of the Labour government; Conclusion; Notes; Conclusion; Notes; Bibliography; Government archives; Private papers; Official publications; Newspapers and periodicals; Documentaries; Books, articles and theses; Index.

No solution demonstrates the naivety of claims that a solution to the Northern Ireland conflict could have been imposed by the British state two decades before the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. It also argues that while there is a tremendous volume of material written on the Northern Ireland conflict, areas remain where there is a poverty of understanding.

Includes bibliographical references (pages 254-264) and index.

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