Private wealth and public revenue in Latin America : business power and tax politics / Tasha Fairfield, London School of Economics.

By:

Fairfield, Tasha, 1973- [author.]

Material type: Text

text

Media type:

computer

Carrier type:

online resource

ISBN:

9781316104767
1316104761
9781316320150
1316320154

Subject(s): Genre/Form:

Electronic books.

Additional physical formats: Print version:: Private wealth and public revenueDDC classification:

339.5/25098 23

LOC classification:

HJ799.53 .F35 2015eb

Online resources:

Click here to access online

Contents:

Tax policy and economic elites : going where the money is -- The power of economic elites -- Organized business and direct taxation in Chile : restricting the agenda -- Circumventing business power in Chile : progress at the margins -- Weak economic elites and direct tax policy success in Argentina -- Sectoral tax politics in Argentina : finance -- Sectoral politics in Argentina : Agriculture -- Bolivia's tax policy tightrope : powerful elites and mobilized masses -- Tax developments under left rule in Bolivia and right rule in Chile.

Summary: Inequality and taxation are fundamental problems of modern times. How and when can democracies tax economic elites? This book develops a theoretical framework that refines and integrates the classic concepts of business's instrumental (political) power and structural (investment) power to explain the scope and fate of tax initiatives targeting economic elites in Latin America after economic liberalization. In Chile, business's multiple sources of instrumental power, including cohesion and ties to right parties, kept substantial tax increases off the agenda. In Argentina, weaker business power facilitated significant reform, although specific sectors, including finance and agriculture, occasionally had instrumental and/or structural power to defend their interests. In Bolivia, popular mobilization counterbalanced the power of economic elites, who were much stronger than in Argentina but weaker than in Chile. The book's in-depth, medium-N case analysis and close attention to policymaking processes contribute insights on business power and prospects for redistribution in unequal democracies.

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Item type	Home library	Collection	Call number	Materials specified	Status	Date due	Barcode
Electronic-Books	OPJGU Sonepat- Campus	E-Books EBSCO			Available

Inequality and taxation are fundamental problems of modern times. How and when can democracies tax economic elites? This book develops a theoretical framework that refines and integrates the classic concepts of business's instrumental (political) power and structural (investment) power to explain the scope and fate of tax initiatives targeting economic elites in Latin America after economic liberalization. In Chile, business's multiple sources of instrumental power, including cohesion and ties to right parties, kept substantial tax increases off the agenda. In Argentina, weaker business power facilitated significant reform, although specific sectors, including finance and agriculture, occasionally had instrumental and/or structural power to defend their interests. In Bolivia, popular mobilization counterbalanced the power of economic elites, who were much stronger than in Argentina but weaker than in Chile. The book's in-depth, medium-N case analysis and close attention to policymaking processes contribute insights on business power and prospects for redistribution in unequal democracies.