Wasting a crisis : why securities regulation fails / Paul G. Mahoney.
Material type:![Text](/opac-tmpl/lib/famfamfam/BK.png)
- text
- computer
- online resource
- 9780226236650
- 022623665X
- 346.73/0926 23
- KF1070 .M34 2015eb
Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Materials specified | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
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OPJGU Sonepat- Campus | E-Books EBSCO | Available |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Long before the New Deal -- The blue sky laws : a tale of progressives and interest groups -- What the Securities Act got right -- What the Securities Act got wrong -- Did the SEC improve disclosure practices? -- Was market manipulation common in the pre-SEC era? -- Regulation of specific industries -- The old is new again : securities reform in the twenty-first century.
Print version record.
This study argues that policy responses to financial crises are similar across time and place and are generally ineffective or counterproductive. Political actors, hoping to avoid blame for a financial crisis, create a 'market failure narrative' arguing that misbehaviour by securities market participants, rather than prior policy errors, was the primary cause of the crisis. Regulatory reforms are therefore designed to solve problems that are either non-existent or tangentially related to the crisis. The reforms often decrease competition and concentrate the market share of leading financial firms.
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