International courts and the performance of international agreements : a general theory with evidence from the European Union / Clifford J. Carrubba, Matthew J. Gabel.
Material type:![Text](/opac-tmpl/lib/famfamfam/BK.png)
- text
- computer
- online resource
- 9781107588592
- 1107588596
- 9781316166789
- 1316166783
- 9781316166345
- 1316166341
- International courts
- International relations
- European Union countries -- Foreign relations
- Tribunaux internationaux
- Relations internationales
- Pays de l'Union européenne -- Relations extérieures
- international relations
- LAW -- International
- Juridictions internationales
- UE/CE Droit
- UE/CE Etats membres
- UE/CE Cour de justice
- Accords internationaux
- Droit international
- Diplomatic relations
- International courts
- International relations
- European Union countries
- Internationale Gerichtsbarkeit
- Internationale Politik
- Internationales Recht
- Europäische Union
- European Union
- Court of Justice of the European Union
- General Court of the European Union
- International courts
- Judicial settlement of international disputes
- Compliance
- International relations
- Theory
- Internationella domstolar
- Internationella relationer
- 341.55 23
- KZ6250 .C37 2015eb
Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Materials specified | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
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OPJGU Sonepat- Campus | E-Books EBSCO | Available |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Nations often turn to international courts to help with overcoming collective-action problems associated with international relations. However, these courts generally cannot enforce their rulings, which begs the question: how effective are international courts? This book proposes a general theory of international courts that assumes a court has no direct power over national governments. Member states are free to ignore both the international agreement and the rulings by the court created to enforce that agreement. The theory demonstrates that such a court can, in fact, facilitate cooperation with international law, but only within important political constraints. The authors examine the theoretical argument in the context of the European Union. Using an original data set of rulings by the European Court of Justice, they find that the disposition of court rulings and government compliance with those rulings comport with the theory's predictions.
Print version record.
International courts and compliance -- A theory of courts and compliance in international law -- Putting the theory to the test : evaluating the hypotheses in the European Union -- Preliminary considerations : designing a control for the legal merits -- The political sensitivity hypothesis : third-party briefs and European Court of justice rulings -- The conditional effectiveness hypothesis : the European court of justice and encoomic integration.
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