The Political Accountability of EU and US Independent Regulatory Agencies.

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The Political Accountability of EU and us Independent Regulatory Agencies; Copyright; Contents; Acknowledgements; List of Tables, Boxes, and Figures; List of Abbreviations; 1 Introduction: The Political Accountability of EU Agencies; 1.1 The Focus of the Book; 1.2 Concepts, Challenges, and Methods; 1.2.1 Defining, Investigating, and Assessing Political Accountability; 1.2.2 Challenges in Studying the Political Accountability of EU Agencies; 1.2.3 Method; 1.2.4 Sources; 1.2.5 Structure of the Book; 2 Holding EU Agencies to Political Account.

2.1 Introducing the Council, the European Parliament, and EU Agencies2.1.1 The Council and the European Parliament; 2.1.2 EU Agencies; 2.2 Investigating the Political Accountability of EU Agencies; 2.2.1 Creation of and Delegation to EU agencies: At the EU Legislator's Discretion; 2.2.2 Appointment and Removal Procedures of EU agencies' Top Officials: A Playground for Political Influences; 2.2.3 Accountability through Statutory Regulation: Theory and Practice of Reporting and Review Clauses; 2.2.4 Financial Oversight: A Well-established Accountability Venue.

2.2.5 Scrutinizing EU Agencies' Performance: An Accountability Venue in Development2.2.6 The 'Common Approach' on the Operation of EU Agencies: Going Forward or Standing Still?; 2.3 Assessing the Political Accountability of EU Agencies; 2.3.1 Availability of Accountability Mechanisms: Harmful Implications of Diverse Accountability Obligations; 2.3.2 'Unconsciousness' of Design of Accountability Provisions; 2.3.3 Practical Application of Accountability Provisions: Facing a Number of Challenges; 3 Holding us Independent Regulatory Agencies to Political Account.

3.1 Introducing the US Congress and US Independent Regulatory Agencies3.1.1 The US Congress; 3.1.2 US Independent Regulatory Agencies; 3.2 Investigating the Political Accountability of US Independent Regulatory Agencies; 3.2.1 Creation of and Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies: At Congress's Will; 3.2.2 The Law and Politics of Appointing and Removing IRAS' Commissioners; 3.2.3 Accountability through Statutory regulation of Agencies' Performance: Learning and Cautionary Experiences; 3.2.4 The Annual Appropriations Process: 'The Accountability Venue'

3.2.5 Congressional Oversight: Strengths and Challenges3.3 Assessing the Political Accountability of US Independent Regulatory Agencies; 3.3.1 The Availability of Accountability Mechanisms: A Solid Arsenal Applicable to All; 3.3.2 The 'Consciousness' of Design of Accountability Mechanisms; 3.3.3 The Practical Application of Accountability Mechanisms: Challenges and Solutions; 4 The Political Accountability of iras in the EU and the US Compared; 4.1 The Availability of Accountability Mechanisms: Diversity Vs. Uniformity; 4.1.1 Similar Accountability Mechanisms.

4.1.2 Similar Mechanisms but Different Approaches.

The Political Accountability of EU and US Independent Regulatory Agencies is an in-depth investigation on the law and practices of the political accountability arrangements of all 35 EU and 16 US independent agencies.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

English.

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