Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control.

By:

Weber, Steve, 1961-

Material type: Text

TextSeries: Princeton legacy libraryPublication details: Princeton : Princeton University Press, 2014.Description: 1 online resource (342 pages)Content type:

text

Media type:

computer

Carrier type:

online resource

ISBN:

9781400862436
1400862434
0691633509
9780691633503

Subject(s): Genre/Form:

Additional physical formats: Print version:: Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control.DDC classification:

327.1/74 20

LOC classification:

JX1974.7

Online resources:

Click here to access online

Contents:

List of Abbreviations ; Preface; 1. Introduction; 2. Current Approaches; 3. Cooperation: A New Approach; 4. Antiballistic Missile Systems; 5. Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles; 6. Antisatellite Weapons; 7. Conclusion; References; Index.

Summary: If international cooperation was difficult to achieve and to sustain during the Cold War, why then were two rival superpowers able to cooperate in placing limits on their central strategic weapons systems? Extending an empirical approach to game theory--particularly that developed by Robert Axelrod--Steve Weber argues that although nations employ many different types of strategies broadly consistent with game theory's ""tit for tat, "" only strategies based on an ideal type of ""enhanced contingent restraint"" promoted cooperation in U.S.-Soviet arms control. As a theoretical analysis of the.

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Print version record.

Cover; Contents.

If international cooperation was difficult to achieve and to sustain during the Cold War, why then were two rival superpowers able to cooperate in placing limits on their central strategic weapons systems? Extending an empirical approach to game theory--particularly that developed by Robert Axelrod--Steve Weber argues that although nations employ many different types of strategies broadly consistent with game theory's ""tit for tat, "" only strategies based on an ideal type of ""enhanced contingent restraint"" promoted cooperation in U.S.-Soviet arms control. As a theoretical analysis of the.

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