Reduction in philosophy of mind : a pluralistic account / Markus I. Eronen.

By:

Eronen, Markus I

Material type: Text

TextSeries: Epistemische Studien (Frankfurt am Main, Germany) ; Bd. 24.Publication details: Frankfurt ; New Brunswick : Ontos Verlag, ©2011.Description: 1 online resource (189 pages) : illustrationsContent type:

text

Media type:

computer

Carrier type:

online resource

ISBN:

9783110332131
3110332132
3868381252
9783868381252
3110322919
9783110322910

Subject(s):

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Additional physical formats: Print version:: Reduction in Philosophy of Mind : A Pluralistic Account.DDC classification:

128.2 23

LOC classification:

BD418.3 .E76 2011eb

Online resources:

Click here to access online

Contents:

pt. 1. Reduction in philosophy of science -- pt. 2. Rethinking reduction in philosophy of mind -- pt. 3. A new framework for philosophy of mind.

Summary: The notion of reduction continues to play a key role in philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive science. Supporters of reductionism claim that psychological properties or explanations reduce to neural properties or explanations, while antireductionists claim that such reductions are not possible. In this book, I apply recent developments in philosophy of science, particularly the mechanistic explanation paradigm and the interventionist theory of causation, to reassess the traditional approaches to reduction in philosophy of mind. I then elaborate and defend a pluralistic framework for p.

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Includes bibliographical references.

pt. 1. Reduction in philosophy of science -- pt. 2. Rethinking reduction in philosophy of mind -- pt. 3. A new framework for philosophy of mind.

The notion of reduction continues to play a key role in philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive science. Supporters of reductionism claim that psychological properties or explanations reduce to neural properties or explanations, while antireductionists claim that such reductions are not possible. In this book, I apply recent developments in philosophy of science, particularly the mechanistic explanation paradigm and the interventionist theory of causation, to reassess the traditional approaches to reduction in philosophy of mind. I then elaborate and defend a pluralistic framework for p.

English.

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