The Somme / Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

The context -- 'Absolutely astonishing': the war committee and the military -- Decision-making, January-February -- Decision-making, March-June -- 'Grasping at the shadow': planning for the Somme, February-June -- 'Favourable results are not anticipated': preparations for battle, June -- 'A short life': VII and VIII corps on 1 July -- 'The enemy's fire was so intense': X corps on 1 July -- 'Wave after wave were mown down': III corps on 1 July -- 'Cowering men in field grey': VX and XIII corps on 1 July -- Reflections on 1 July -- 'Ill-considered attacks on a small front', 2-13 July -- 'Cavalry sharpening their swords', 14 July -- 'We are a bit stuck', 15-31 July -- 'Something wanting in the methods employed', 1 August-12 September -- 'A hell of a time': Posières and Mouquet farm, July-August -- Summary, 15 July-12 September -- The politicians and the Somme campaign, July-August -- One division's Somme: the first division, July-September -- 'An operation planned on bolder lines': tanks and the 15 September plan -- Lumbering tanks: the battle of 15 September -- 25 September -- 'The tragic hill of Thiepval', 26-30 September -- 'A severe trail of body and spirit': the Somme, October -- 'We must keep going!': the politicians and the Somme campaign, September-October -- The political battle: Beaumont Hamel, 13-19 November -- Reflections on the British at the Somme -- The end of it all, November 1916.

"In the long history of the British Army, the Battle of the Somme was its bloodiest encounter. Between 1 July and mid-November 1916, 432,000 of its soldiers became casualties -- about 3,600 for every day of battle. German casualties, it is estimated, were far fewer -- probably 230,000 -- even though the British possessed superiority in the air and in artillery, the most lethal weapon on the Western Front." "What went wrong for the British, and who was responsible? Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson have examined the entire public archive covering the Somme campaign in 1916 and reconstruct the day-by-day course of the war. The colossal rate of infantry casualties was not the result of defects in the infantry itself, but the inadequacy of the fire support. Responsibility for tactical mistakes was not that of the brigadiers or divisional commanders, but of the High Command and the civilian War Committee. Field-Marshall Haig is shown as repeatedly deficient in strategy, tactics, command and organisation." "Hundreds of thousands of soldiers lay down their lives in a campaign which lacked both a coherent military plan and responsible political leadership."--Jacket.

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